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Terrorism returned to the top of the international agenda with the attacks on
September 11, 2001. In the following years, repeated attacks in multiple countries
have kept terrorism a salient threat, and it has challenged both social cohesion
and democratic governance of liberal democracies. A crucial question is how
terrorism affects the relationship between the majority population and different
out-groups. As terrorism is seen as highly illegitimate and as there is widespread
contempt for terrorists in democracies, terrorist attacks may challenge the status
and inclusion of groups that the public associate with terrorism. This is a central
problem for democracies as protection of minority rights and tolerance of political
disagreement are hallmarks of democratic society.
This thesis studies the effects of terrorism on three types of attitudes toward out-
groups. The first involves attitudes toward day-to-day interactions with out-groups,
specifically the necessity of taking precautionary measures in these interactions.
The second concerns attitudes toward the state’s domestic policies and the extent
to which the state should use counterterrorism measures to avoid terrorist attacks.
Finally, terrorism may affect support for the precautionary measures that the state
may direct toward allowing out-groups entry inside the borders, i.e. increase
support for immigration control. All three lead to the overall research question of
this thesis: “How does terrorism affect attitudes toward out-groups?”
This thesis proposes an analytical framework to understand how terrorism
affects attitudes — a framework that goes beyond the extant literature and its focus
on fear and threat levels. Research on terrorism’s effects on attitudes started in
earnest after the attacks on September 11, 2001, on New York City and Washington,
D.C. These attacks and subsequent Islamic terrorist attacks in the West have been
characterized by their high levels of brutality relative to other types of terrorism
(Piazza 2009). Extant literature on the effects of terrorism on attitudes has focused
on how the terrorist threat is perceived and the effects from fear that terrorist attacks
create. While this research has provided important insights into the consequences
of terrorism in general and on attitudes toward out-groups more specifically, there
is reason to believe that the effects from terrorism may be contingent on political
factors that has so far received scarce attention. Three political factors that affect
the public’s interpretation of attacks are central in the framework developed in
this thesis: the terrorist group’s ideology and background, the public reaction and
framing of the attacks, and the public’s prior political attitudes. This framework is
used to broaden our understanding of how terrorism affects a central characteristic
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of Western democracies: the protection of minorities and out-groups.
The three papers jointly illuminate the research question. The first examines
the reaction to the right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011.
Norwegians responded to the attacks with increased trust in out-groups, and the
analyses indicate that this was a reaction to the political response to the attacks, and
not solely to the right-wing extremist ideology itself. Importantly, the reaction was
moderated by individuals’ prior political views, and the effect was smaller among
those who already held negative views toward immigration or were affiliated with
the anti-immigrant Progress Party. The second paper follows up on the findings
of an effect from the political response by comparing the French reaction to the
Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks with the public’s reactions in six other
European countries. While people became more negative toward immigration
outside of France, this was not the case in France itself. This is interpreted to be an
effect stemming from the French political and societal response to the attacks —
a response underlining the French Republic’s central (tolerant) values, such as
laïcité. The third paper delves deeper into the importance of group ideology and
background. It examines both the importance of terrorists’ ideology and that
of the groups targeted by policies and immigration attitudes in terms of support
for security measures. In general, people support targeting threatening groups
relative to others and being reminded of a terrorist threat increases support for
counterterrorism measures toward even unrelated groups. Dovetailing with the
first paper’s findings, this paper looks at how immigration attitudes moderate the
effects from terrorism news on support for security measures that target different
groups. People who are negative towards immigration are found to not distinguish
between targeting Muslims and Islamists in their support for counterterrorism
measures.
The three papers investigate the effects from terrorism through survey data
with state of the art methods. Moving beyond the use of cross-sectional post-attack
surveys, this thesis combines three different methodological designs and datasets.
The first uses a unique panel fielded on both sides of the July 22, 2011 attacks
in Norway. The second exploits the random timing of a terrorist attack under the
seventh round of the European Social Survey, and combines this with a comparison
of different effects in different countries to find the effect of the domestic framing.
The third paper uses a comparative survey experiment which is developed to give
new information on the effects from the threat of terrorism. Overall, the papers
demonstrate the importance of taking a broader set of factors into account when
studying terrorism. These factors and the analytical framework presented here give
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a more nuanced understanding of the effects of terrorism.
This thesis studies terrorism’s effects on attitudes in Europe and in the U.S.
This part of the world has a relatively homogeneous relationship with terrorism
and immigration. In the past decades, the countries have mainly experienced
Islamic and right-wing extremist terror attacks and immigration has emerged as
a central political cleavage. Most extant research so far has studied the conse-
quences of Islamic terrorist attacks. As will be discussed below, there is reason
to believe that the effects of Islamic terrorism may be different from other types
of terrorism, and that the findings in extant research may have overlooked differ-
ences between terrorism’s effects in general and Islamic terrorism’s effects more
specifically. The inclusion of right-wing extremist terrorism in this study facili-
tates important comparisons between terrorism’s general effects and the effects of
terrorism with different political motivations.
It is terrorism’s effects in the short term that is studied in this thesis. While
the effects examined here may be short-lived, this study is motivated by the be-
lief that terrorist attacks and their attitudinal consequences may elicit important,
broader consequences for societies and policies. Following Kingdon (2014, p. 96),
a terrorist attack may serve as a focusing event, after which “even inaction is a
decision” and after which policy changes are highly likely. Terrorist attacks affect
both the “problems stream” by putting terrorism on the political agenda and the
“politics stream” by changing the public mood. This may, in turn, lead to windows
of opportunity that political entrepreneurs can exploit to create policies that last
much longer than any attitudinal changes.
The following chapter starts with a discussion of the definition of terrorism
used in this thesis, then the principal findings from extant research are presented
and this research’s emphasis on threat and fear is discussed. Following this, the
political framework is presented with its three factors: the terrorists’ background,
the framing of attacks, and the public’s prior attitudes. The three research questions
are presented and discussed in the context of extant research in the next section,
before the cases and methodology of the different papers are discussed. The papers
are then presented followed by the principal findings of this thesis. Limitations




A longstanding lack of consensus has existed on one clear definition of terrorism.
As a pejorative term, terrorism has been used politically to describe enemies,
but not friends (Schmid 2011, p. 40). There has been a broad academic debate
leading to different meta-theoretical works that discuss different definitions applied
in the research (Schmid 2004, 2011; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler
2004).1 For the purposes of this thesis, a definition should set criteria that clearly
distinguish terrorist cases from other types of social phenomena, such as crime
and political activism. However, the debate on the definition of terrorism has led
to the development of maximalist definitions that have prioritized describing all
important characteristics of terrorism, rather than setting criteria for what types
of actions that can be understood as terrorism. Thus, these definitions include
characteristics that either are not necessary for an event to be characterized as
terrorism (i.e., that terrorism is often part of a campaign), or that do not exclude
any events from being terrorism (i.e., that terrorism is perpetrated by both groups
and individuals). They are accordingly not very useful in the selection of cases.
In this thesis, the minimal definition by Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-
Hoefler (2004) is used and expanded to include the characteristic of targeting
civilians. These authors compare the results from a review of 24 years of journal
articles with Alex Schmid’s “consensus definition” from 1984, which was cre-
ated through the use of an expert survey (Schmid 1984). Their minimal definition
is as follows: “Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or
use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”
(Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004, p. 786). This definition includes
three central traits that distinguish terrorism from related phenomena.2 Political
motivation distinguish terrorism from crime, and the use of violence or threats dis-
tinguish it from more legitimate political actions. The pursuit of media coverage
is an important third trait, as it distinguishes terrorism from other types of political
violence, such as political purges or politicides. While these three criteria delineate
the phenomenon in important ways, it is also necessary to include the targeting
1 One debate not relevant here is if terrorism can be perpetrated by states or not, and for the
purposes of this thesis, state terrorism is excluded. See Schmid (2011, p. 69), Hoffman (2006), and
Wilkinson (2006) for different views.
2 This definition defines terrorism as a tactic and thus does not give a definition of who are
“terrorists” or not. In the following, I use the word terrorists for people (or groups) who either
carry out terrorist attacks or who adhere to the terrorism as a doctrine (for more on terrorism as a
doctrine, see Schmid 2011, p. 86).
5
of civilians to distinguish terrorism from guerrilla attacks (Weinberg, Pedahzur,
and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004, p. 787). Guerrilla attacks do, at times, fulfill the three
criteria: They are politically motivated, use violence, and sometimes pursue media
coverage in their choices of targets, but they particularly differ from terrorism in
that they target the opposing military rather than civilians.3 The definition also
excludes other characteristics that are usually included in definitions of terrorism,
the most important of which is the goal of creating fear.4 Next, I will discuss why
the goal of creating fear is excluded from the definition used here.
The goal of creating fear often is included in definitions of terrorism. Indeed,
the Latin etymology of the word terror includes fear. However, this goal is not
included here for two reasons.5 On the one hand, there is reason to doubt that this
is a goal in all terrorist attacks. Most terrorist groups have a constituency, a (some-
times imagined) group that the terrorist group perceives as approving its use of
violence (Crenshaw 1991). Terrorists seek to inspire these groups (or the masses)
through their attacks via the “Propaganda by the Deed”, rather than immobilize the
public through fear (Crenshaw 1986). Thus, fear may not be the primary goal of an
attack. Kurtulus (2017), in a study of multiple terrorist ideologues’ writings, finds
no mention of any goal of creating fear. Rather, fear is perceived as debilitating,
reducing the mobilization of the public. A second problem with defining terrorism
3 Guerrillas are often dependent on the tacit or active support from civilians and this may be
achieved both peacefully and through repression. Weinstein (2007, pp. 8-9) argues that this choice
is dependent on the starting conditions of the guerrillas and the members they recruit. Under
conditions of resource abundance they use pay-offs to motivate rebellion, but when there are less
resources they have to rely on recruiting members motivated to the cause of the organization.
4 Schmid (2011), Wilkinson (2006), and Hoffman (2006) include further characteristics in their
definitions. Wilkinson (2006, p. 1) includes the premeditated character of attacks, Hoffman (2006,
p. 40) includes the perpetrators’ connection to a group and Schmid (2011, p. 86) that attacks often
are part in a broader campaign of some sort. These characteristics are not included here in the
definition for different reasons. That attacks often are parts of campaigns is not included because
some attacks are not, and this thus does not exclude attacks from being terrorism. That campaigns
and the repetition of attacks have a stronger effect, both on attitudes and policy is another matter
(Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015). Most terrorists, and even “lone wolfs”, have a connection
to a group, but there are examples of attacks that while they are clearly terrorist attacks had no
such group connection (Schuurman et al. 2018). One can question whether terrorist attacks that
were not premeditated should be excluded from being terrorism given that they were politically
motivated and pursuing media attention.
5 Rapin (2011) goes to the opposite extreme and argues that we should abandon the term terror-
ism altogether and rather use “terror” for acts that actually create terror or fear in the population.
In his view, the interesting part of terrorism is not its motivation, but rather how the terror it creates
may have different effects. Here however, the argument is that it is interesting to study the effects
of terrorist attacks also when they are not successful in creating terror in the population, that is, the
effects of using terrorism as a tactic may be interesting in themselves.
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as a strategy to create fear is that it is difficult to establish terrorists’ intentions.
Evaluating the extent to which terrorist attacks are designed to create fear may de-
pend on the consequences of an attack, rather than on the actual intentions behind
the attack. While certain groups may view the creation of fear as a goal, the em-
phasis on fear in definitions of terrorism may be a consequence of the “pursuit of
publicity” and that the same mechanisms (i.e., novelty and scale) may lead to both
media coverage and, thus, fear within the public. Considering that the attitudinal
consequences of terrorism are the focus of the present study, basing the definition
of terrorism on its effects may amount to selection on the dependent variable.
The current wave of Islamic terrorism in the West may be creating more fear
than earlier types of terrorism. These terrorists have smaller (domestic) constituen-
cies and more universalist goals, leading to less discriminate violence and more
casualties (Hemmingby 2017; Piazza 2009). Indeed, killing civilians in Europe
and in the U.S. may be perceived as a goal in itself, as they are viewed as the
enemy and a legitimate target in what the terrorists perceive as a war between
Muslims and the West. As outlined in the next section, current extant research has
emphasized the role of fear in creating terrorism’s attitudinal effects.
Terrorism and attitudes toward out-groups
The attitudinal consequences of terrorism received little attention before 9/11.6
These attacks and the continued threat from Islamic terrorism in the following
years led to research on the consequences of terrorism on political attitudes. A
central finding in this research is terrorism’s negative effect on attitudes toward
out-groups. This effect has been found across different types of out-group attitudes
and on attitudes toward both groups connected and unconnected to terrorism. The
literature since 9/11 has been preoccupied with the consequences of the threat of
terrorism and fear. Terrorism and terrorist attacks are thought to heighten percep-
tions of threat in the public, and these perceptions, in turn, are thought to have
consequences for other attitudes, especially through different types of anxiety and
fear. This research has examined the consequences of two different threat types.
Some of this research has examined the consequences of sociotropic threats, i.e.,
threats to society or the national community, while other research has emphasized
6 Among the few early studies, Hewitt (1990) finds that new-left terrorism in Europe did not
change support for the cause of the terrorists and C. W. Lewis (2000) finds that the Oklahoma
bombing did not affect Americans’ attitudes.
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the consequences of egotropic threats, i.e., threats to oneself, and especially the
effects of being reminded of death.
Perceptions of sociotropic (societal) threats from terrorism lead to prejudice
and support for stereotypes toward groups related to terrorism, mainly toward
Arabs or Muslims in the current situation in the West (Huddy, Feldman, Cape-
los, et al. 2002; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber 2007; Traugott et al. 2002). This
mechanism has been proposed to help explain findings of increased negativity
toward immigrants after terrorist attacks as well (Legewie 2013; Schüller 2016).
Threat is thought to work through anxiety, and anxiety motivates people to seek
protection from the anxiety’s causes (e.g., the threat of terrorism) (Albertson and
Gadarian 2015, pp. 5,12,120). Thus, anxiety may explain the increase in support
for security measures (Bozzoli and Müller 2011; Davis and Silver 2004; Haider-
Markel, Joslyn, and Al-Baghal 2006; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, et al. 2005; Lahav
and Courtemanche 2012; Malhotra and Popp 2012) and restrictions on immigra-
tion (Finseraas, Jakobsson, and Kotsadam 2011; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012;
Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Noelle-Neumann 2002) after terrorist attacks.
A second strand of research has examined the effects of threat to the individual,
rather than on society. While attitudes on immigration primarily are determined
by perceptions of sociotropic threat (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016;
Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 2015),7 research on terrorism also has found ev-
idence of effects from egotropic threat, i.e., the threat to oneself.8 Drawing on
Terror management theory and related theories (Greenberg et al. 1990; Pyszczyn-
ski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003), this line of research emphasizes the effects of
death reminders and existential anxiety (Das et al. 2009; Echebarria-Echabe and
Fernández-Guede 2006; Nugier et al. 2016). Terror management theory takes its
starting point in the fact that humans understand that they are mortal, and argues
that anxiety over one’s mortality leads to different coping strategies. One way in
which humans cope with death anxiety is through adherence to world views and
religions that usually promise some form of immortality. Only one such world
7 This could be explained by the low prevalence of egotropic threats from immigration as for
example the competition over jobs may affect small groups of people (Malhotra, Margalit, and
Mo 2013). Finseraas, Røed, and Schøne (2017) argue that it is problems with measuring the
effects correctly that leads to the null-findings. They find indications of a polarizing rather than a
unidirectional effect.
8 It is possible that this difference is primarily caused by differences in the types of threat. While
research on immigration attitudes has primarily studied cultural and economic threats, terrorism
also poses a threat to individuals’ security (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Canetti-Nisim,
Ariely, and Halperin 2008) and it is indeed being reminded of death that is hypothesized as causing
the effects on attitudes toward out-groups.
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view may be correct at the same time, so other people’s world views threaten the
promise of immortality within our own world view. Being reminded of one’s own
mortality (through terrorism) may lead to different coping strategies, one of which,
the so-called world view defense, bolsters one’s own world view while disparaging
others’ world views. Thus, increased prejudice and affiliation with an in-group
may be consequences of terrorism reminding people of their own mortality
These findings show that terrorism may affect out-groups defined by two dif-
ferent characteristics. On the one hand, the findings indicate that terrorism affect
attitudes toward minority groups defined by their ethnoreligious background in
general. There have as mentioned been found effects on attitudes toward both
Muslims and Jews. The three studies here thus study both attitudes toward specific
out-groups and more general attitudes toward people of a different religion or dif-
ferent nationality. On the other hand, the effects of terrorism on attitudes toward
Muslims could however indicate that the effects are caused by the group’s rela-
tionship to terrorism. In other words, terrorism may affect attitudes toward groups
that are believed to be connected to the terrorist threat. Sniderman et al. (2014)
show that people in general tolerate groups that are considered “transgressive” to
a lower extent than other groups. People are for example more supportive of the
rights of Muslims than those of Islamists. Terrorism could thus both affect the
attitudes toward transgressive groups, and change the views of which groups are
transgressive. The third paper studies how terrorism affects attitudes toward both
transgressive and more democratically inclined groups.
There is reason to believe that the political characteristics of both terrorist at-
tacks and the societal reaction to them may affect the consequences of terrorism.
So far, this has not been studied in extant research on terrorism’s attitudinal ef-
fects. Recent Islamic attacks in the West have been relatively violent (see e.g.,
Hemmingby 2017; Piazza 2009), and the “War on Terror” seems to have become
a macro frame for understanding the terrorist threat (Norris, Kern, and Just 2003).
Simultaneously, little variation has been seen in political reactions to terrorism
and the terrorists’ ideological background, and the lethality of attacks may have
made threat and fear more relevant than after more discriminate terrorist attacks.
In the following section, I outline a political framework for understanding the con-
sequences of terrorist attacks. This framework considers a broader set of factors
than just the direct affective response to the atrocities themselves.
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A political perspective
Factors outside of the terrorists’ control are central to the political consequences
of terrorism. Terrorists seek to reach their goals through the media coverage of
attacks (Hoffman 2006, p. 40; Schmid 2011, p. 86; Wilkinson 2006, p. 1; Weinberg,
Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004, p. 786), and terrorist attacks may be able to set
the political agenda. However, the media coverage of terrorism seldom focuses on
the terrorists’ political goals (McDonald and Lawrence 2004), and to the extent that
extremists and terrorist attacks do get media attention, this attention is not focused
on their causes or ideology (Kelly and Mitchell 1981; Larsen 2018; Schmid 1989).
The public is accordingly often unable to interpret the terrorists’ goals from an
attack (Moghaddam 2006, p. 19), and it is prone to infer extremist goals from the
terrorists’ extreme tactics (Abrahms 2012). Because terrorism is a blunt method
of communicating a political message, terrorists often are unable to influence the
framing of their attacks.9 The consequences of an attack may thus be dependent
on other factors that affect the public’s interpretation of it — factors such as the
terrorist group’s background, the dominant framing of an attack, and the public’s
prior attitudes. In the following section, I outline an analytical framework for
how terrorist attacks affect the public. This framework takes its starting point in
the information available to the public after a terrorist attack. I begin with the
importance of the terrorists’ ideology and background, before I discuss the effects
from the framing of attacks and prior political attitudes.
Ideology and background of terrorist groups
Little information is available to the public after terrorist attacks, as they are not
very informative in themselves. Terrorists are however, by definition, motivated
by a political ideology and even most “lone wolfs” subscribe to a terrorist group
(Schuurman et al. 2018).10 The media coverage in the immediate aftermath of an
9 Even terrorist groups themselves know they are unable to anticipate the effects of their at-
tacks and they often await the public response before they decide to take credit or not for attacks
(Abrahms and Conrad 2017). The choice of target and amount of casualties are also central in the
terrorists’ planning as they are the only means available to the terrorists to affect the interpretation
of an attack (Hemmingby 2017; Hemmingby and Bjørgo 2016). Hemmingby and Bjørgo (2016,
p. 38) show how the right-wing extremist terrorist that perpetrated the July 22, 2011 attacks in
Norway, contemplated the effects of different types of targets. Targeting Muslims or immigrants
was dismissed because he believed it would create a backlash against his cause.
10 The political goals are central to the definition of an attack as terrorism and not crime (Hoffman
2006; Schmid 2011; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004; Wilkinson 2006). While two
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attack often is dominated by the question of whether terrorists were responsible,
and in recent years, this often has been a question tied to terrorists’ religious back-
ground (Huff and Kertzer 2018; Powell 2011). Terrorist groups do not always take
responsibility for attacks (Abrahms and Conrad 2017), but the perpetrators’ back-
ground usually is revealed during the investigation. Thus, the terrorists’ political
affiliation generally becomes known relatively quickly after an attack.
Because most studies on the attitudinal effects of terrorism were done after
the 9/11 attacks, few studies have been done concerning attacks perpetrated by
other groups than Islamic terrorists. Thus, the findings of increased out-group
derogation and more negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (see
above) may reflect a connection between Islamic terrorism and immigration. The
reaction to the attacks on July 22, 2011 in Norway could support such a conclusion.
In the early hours after the attacks, the media speculated that the bombing in the
city center was carried out by Islamic terrorists, and it took some time before the
right-wing extremist motivation of the attacks became publicly known. During
this period, there were multiple attacks on people perceived to be Muslim (as
documented by Haarr and Partapuoli 2012). When the true background of the
terrorist was known however, the public response became one that emphasized
tolerance (Jenssen and Bye 2013). Thus, while the negative effects toward out-
groups have been interpreted in the context of the threat of terrorism, they may be
a consequence of the specific type of terrorism that has been studied.
Framing and societal reaction
“We condemn actions that disrupt public security and disturb the peace
of the people and sow terror [..] I hope that people remain calm be-
cause it is all controllable.” (Indonesian President, Joko Widodo on
January 14, 2016, in a speech after the Islamic terrorist attacks in
Jakarta that killed four and injured 20 cited in Friedman (2016).)
Terrorists often set the political agenda through their actions, but while ter-
rorism may be atop the political agenda, the consequences of this depend on the
interpretation of the attacks. This interpretation and its policy implications often
depend on how political leaders, the media and the public itself frame the attack.
Following Entman (1993), the function of frames is to diagnose, evaluate and pre-
scribe. Frames diagnose the problems and their causes, leading to evaluations of
events may have very similar characteristics, the definition of an event as terrorism seems to have
important consequences for both the media coverage and the attitudinal consequences.
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the different causal agents. Finally, frames prescribe certain solutions and treat-
ments for the diagnosed problem. The media frames dominating media coverage
and those that politicians employ may be important. As I discuss below, the com-
bination of a monopoly on information, a rally effect, and a less-critical media
strengthen the government’s ability to set the dominant framing after an attack.
Political leadership plays a central role in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.
Through speeches and other public appearances, the prime minister or president
becomes a central leader for the public, and that leader’s framing of an attack
may affect the public’s interpretation. The government controls information from
the investigation, and this information may be crucial to understanding (i.e., the
diagnosis of) the events. The 2004 attacks in Madrid serve as an example. The
government blamed the terrorist group ETA from the start without any decisive
evidence and decided to continue blaming ETA even when the official investigation
was following leads suggesting that Al Qaeda was behind the attacks, something
that proved to be the case (Fominaya 2011). This incorrect diagnosis led to a
framing that connected the attacks to the ongoing political conflict between the
government and Spain’s regional independence movements, which had nothing to
do with the motivation for the attacks.11
The government’s monopoly on information from investigations suggests it
plays an important role in the frame’s diagnosis of events, and the rally effect may
make it easier for political leaders to frame terrorist attacks successfully. The rally
effect, characterized by increased support for political leadership, occurs when
political leaders (especially presidents and prime ministers) become symbols of
the national community (Hetherington and Nelson 2003) and when anxious peo-
ple look to leaders for reassurance (Chanley 2002; Landau et al. 2004; Sinclair
and LoCicero 2010).12 Indeed, while the rally effect originally was thought to oc-
cur only after international events, domestic terrorist attacks without international
connections also seem to create rallies (Stapley 2012; Wollebæk, Steen-Johnsen,
et al. 2013).13 Public rallies are marked by little political dissent, and the frames
11 The main motto of the demonstrations after the attacks was “With the victims, with the
constitution and for the defeat of terrorism”. Since regional movements want to change the Spanish
constitution so that it devolves more rights to the regions, the reference to the constitution meant
support for the central government. The demonstrations however partly turned on the government
with large groups chanting “Who did it?”
12 The rally effect seems to differ between groups, and studies have found that it is those that
were least critical of the government that rallies (Edwards and Swenson 1997), that people with
high political awareness are less likely to rally (Ladd 2007) and that there might be differences
based on race in the U.S. (Perrin and Smolek 2009).
13 Randahl (2018) finds that this is only the case after especially large attacks in the U.S. How-
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that political leaders employ often are left unopposed by the political opposition
(Chowanietz 2010). This is possibly both a cause and a consequence of the rally
effect itself, as the rally may make it difficult to criticize the government, while
a lack of criticism may increase support for the government (Hetherington and
Nelson 2003).
Journalists change their role after terrorism, and become preoccupied with
recreating the national community and with assigning meaning to suffering after
terrorist attacks (Alexander 2004; Kitch 2003; Schudson 2003). During the af-
termath of terrorist attacks, the media take a less-critical role and contribute to
the rallying around the political leadership (Olsson, Söderlund, and Falkheimer
2015). Journalists even have been observed following governmental framing when
they criticize the government (S. C. Lewis and Reese 2009). This “suspension of
suspicion” (Zandberg and Neiger 2005) may be reinforced by the lack of criticism
from the political opposition. Media have a tendency to index the debates in the
political elites, and when there is a lack of debate, the media becomes one-sided
(Bennett 1990; Entman 2003; Jamieson and Waldman 2003, p. 14; Norris, Kern,
and Just 2003, p. 12). The lack of criticism from the opposition may be a con-
sequence of more or less deliberate media gatekeeping, i.e., not allowing critical
voices and perspectives to be heard (Figenschou and Beyer 2014; Thorbjørnsrud
and Figenschou 2018).
While the media become less critical of the government, journalists are often
among the first people at the scene of an attack. Thus, the first frames of an
attack are created through media broadcasts before the government can provide
any clear framing. Central parts of what became the “War on Terror” frame already
were parts of the immediate media coverage after 9/11 (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and
Shapiro 2011, ch. 1). While President Bush’s speeches were crucial in setting a
coherent frame, on the day of the attacks, media used a war metaphor, discussed
possible restrictions on civil liberties, and drew a connection between the attacks
and Afghanistan, as well as Iraq. This indicates that the media may set the stage
for what kinds of frames that are possible after an attack.
A lack of dissent from the opposition and media may increase governmental
frames’ effectiveness. Extant research shows that frames’ effects are strongest
when no counter-frames are present (Chong and Druckman 2010, 2013; Gershkoff
and Kushner 2005; Lecheler and de Vreese 2016), and that conversely, counter-
frames reduce a frame’s effectiveness. Thus, the aftermaths of terrorist attacks are
ever, he studies all terrorist attacks with U.S. citizens among the casualties, also attacks in countries
far away.
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periods when the dominant frames may be especially effective. As long as the
political leadership chooses a frame that the public accepts, it is probable that this
framing will affect the interpretation of the attacks and prescribe its political con-
sequences. Of course, some limits exist as to which frames the public and media
will accept. The framing that the Spanish government chose after the Madrid 2004
attacks again may serve as an example. Although the government’s monopoly on
information lasted for some time, pointing to the wrong perpetrators (ETA instead
of Al Qaeda) and trying to exploit the attacks for political goals (anti-separatism)
ended in failure (Canel and Sanders 2010; Fominaya 2011; Sinkkonen 2016). In-
deed, Montalvo (2011, 2012) uses results from early voting in the elections to
show that support for the government’s ruling party shifted negatively during the
final week before elections, leading up to the party’s defeat. Moreover, the gov-
ernmental framing in Spain was problematic on many different levels, and it is
difficult to generalize from this case.
While the framing of an attack may depend on a combination of political
responses and media coverage, the public also may influence frames (see e.g.,
Døving 2018). The public often mobilizes after terrorist attacks through demon-
strations in which the populace “reclaims” the city and shows its opposition to
the terrorists (Cronin 2009, p. 109; Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen, and Wollebæk 2012;
Ross 1995). These mobilizations may give prescriptions for the correct behavior
when facing the threat. In recent years, these expressions also have proliferated
on social media (Innes et al. 2016). For example, the French public showed its
defiance and courage after the November 2015 terrorist attacks by returning to
Parisian cafés and publishing photos on social media (Browning 2018). Social
media and public manifestations may influence the emotional consequences of an
attack. At the scenes of attacks and at other symbolic public spaces, spontaneous
shrines often are created (Grønstad 2013; Jorgensen-Earp and Lanzilotti 1998;
Santino 2003). These shrines after attacks may be important as a public coping
mechanism, as they facilitate the expression of different types of emotions.
The framing and public reaction may be important to the hypothesized positive
effects on social trust from national crises. Extant literature on social trust and
social capital emphasizes the positive effects from experiencing national crises
(Putnam 2000, ch. 24; Sander and Putnam 2009, p. 408; Uslaner 2002, p. 189).
There seems to be an expectation that sharing experiences creates a feeling of
being in “the same boat,” thereby making us feel more like other people. Similarity
enhances trust, and accordingly trust increases as strangers become less “strange”.
However, Uslaner (2002) also describes how some events may be “divisive”, but
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does not go into detail as to why some events are galvanizing and some are not. His
use of the Vietnam War as an example of an event that is divisive may indicate that
periods with high levels of debate and disagreement are not galvanizing to the same
extent as periods where there is less discord. This leads to a possible expectation
of terrorism as a type of galvanizing event because of the lack of opposition to the
dominant framing (see above).
Prior political attitudes
“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”
Terrorist ideologies often have been connected to the principal political debates
in society, and this is the case for both Islamic and right-wing extremist terrorism.
These two types of terrorism, in different ways, are connected to the debate on
immigration and to the related debate on the role of Muslims in the West. The
debate on immigration is highly salient in both Europe and the U.S., and one could
expect that individuals’ prior attitudes and exposure to this debate may influence
their reactions to terrorism. While much research has investigated the question
of how terrorism affects attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, few have
studied how the effects of terrorism are contingent on this political debate and
people’s prior attitudes.14
Terrorism often creates backlashes against the terrorist groups. These back-
lashes may in addition make people develop negative attitudes toward the terrorist
ideology (Jakobsson and Blom 2014). However, people (and governments) who
support the terrorists’ cause often view terrorist groups as legitimate actors, as ex-
pressed in the quote that introduced this section (Moghaddam 2006, p. 9; Schmid
2011, p. 40). At least tacit support for terrorism often exists among what has
been called the terrorist “constituency” (Crenshaw 1991), i.e., those who are most
in agreement with the terrorists and whom terrorists aim to mobilize into action
(Brown 2018; Wilkinson 2006, p. 149). However, these (sometimes imagined)
constituencies do not have an unlimited tolerance for violence (Crenshaw 1991),
and attacks that are especially egregious may lead to a loss of support for the
terrorist groups (Cronin 2009; Malkki 2010). It is unclear whether such attacks
reduce support for the cause, as some continuation of the political struggle by more
peaceful means usually exists (Ross 1995; Wheatley and McCauley 2008), and it
14 To a certain extent this has to do with difficulties in studying events such as terrorism and the
related lack of data (see more below).
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is possible that terrorism may affect the constituency less than other groups. Extant
research on attitudes generally shows that people are biased in how they receive
new information, i.e., information that goes against prior attitudes is discounted
(Karlsen et al. 2017; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2008; Taber and Lodge 2006). Any
possible negative effects from terrorism on support for the ideology may affect the
constituency’s attitudes the least.
Research questions
Using the framework outlined above, this thesis explores three research questions,
each of which concerns a different dependent variable that may be expected to
be connected to terrorism. While all have been studied before in the context of
terrorism, they vary widely in the numbers of extant studies that have examined
them, with very few studies having examined terrorism’s effects on out-group trust
and many having studied counterterrorism and immigration attitudes. This leads
to different levels of specificity in expectations. In this section, the three research
questions are presented and discussed in the context of the framework and extant
research.
The first research question is:
Research question 1. How do terrorist attacks affect out-group trust?
Out-group trust is intrinsically connected to terrorists’ group background. Trust
involves some form of vulnerability to the trustee’s actions. Following Hardin
(2006), it depends on the belief that the trustee has encapsulated our interest, i.e.,
that the trustee considers our interests when he or she makes decisions. Terrorism
demonstrates the opposite of trustworthiness, as the terrorists try to inflict harm.
Thus, there is reason to believe that trust in terrorism-related groups may decline
after terrorist attacks (Hardin 2006, p. 127). However trust seems to be affected
by more than just the expectation of trustworthiness. Uslaner (2002) argues that
trust is better understood as a moral obligation. People believe they have a moral
obligation to expect the best of each other and trust others, even when one has
no knowledge of another person’s trustworthiness. To support this claim, Uslaner
points to extant research that finds social trust to be very stable over time, and that
it correlates with values that our parents instill in us during early childhood (e.g.
Algan and Cahuc 2010, on the inheritability of trust). These two perspectives on
trust each hark back to one part of the framework. On one hand, terrorism may
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affect trust in the group that is perceived to be creating the threat, as this group is
not deemed trustworthy. On the other hand, the framing of an attack may affect
the perceptions of trust as a moral obligation.
Extant research on trust after terrorist attacks primarily has been concerned
with generalized trust, and some evidence exists of higher generalized trust after
terrorist attacks (Geys and Qari 2017; Traugott et al. 2002). As for trust in out-
groups, less research is available, but using data from the right-wing extremist
attacks on July 22, 2011 in Norway, (Wollebæk, Enjolras, et al. 2012; Wollebæk,
Steen-Johnsen, et al. 2013) show that Norwegians increased both their generalized
trust and their trust in people with a different religion and nationality. Huddy,
Feldman, and Weber (2007) use an index based on questions about Arabs’ charac-
teristics, including one on their trustworthiness, and find that after 9/11, Americans
who perceived a terrorist threat showed higher support for negative stereotypes of
Arabs. The group background of the terrorists thus seems to be important for the
change in trust.
As discussed however, the effects of egotropic threats seem to be indiscrim-
inate and even affect attitudes toward unrelated out-groups. Following Terror-
management theory (Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003), being reminded
of one’s mortality increases out-group derogation and in-group bolstering. Thus,
death reminders may increase negativity toward all types of out-groups and are not
dependent on the out-group in question creating the threat, nor on the terrorism
being done by an out-group at all.15 One example of these effects can be seen in the
findings of increased support for stereotypes about Jews after the Islamic terrorist
attacks in Madrid (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006), and another
is the finding of less sympathy toward gays by people experiencing terrorism as a
threat in the U.S. (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, ch. 3). The effects of egotropic
threats are less connected to the group perpetrating terrorism, and it is possible
that terrorism affects trust in out-groups in general, rather than specifically trust in
the out-group that created the threat.
The importance of group background also may be dependent on the framing
of an attack. The group membership of terrorists can be framed both in general
(e.g.., Muslims) and more specific (e.g., Islamic fundamentalist) terms. This fram-
15 In democratic societies it may be difficult to imagine a terrorist group that is not considered an
out-group at the very least because of their violent methods. Accordingly, even terrorist groups that
have legitimate political goals are probably seen as out-groups. In situations where the government
is considered illegitimate by large groups of the population such as in some autocracies or in times
of occupation, terrorist groups may be seen as part of a broader resistance and thus not to be an
out-group to the same extent.
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ing may, in turn, elicit consequences for social groups perceived as untrustworthy.
Hajer and Uitermark (2008) study local politicians’ reactions to the 2004 murder
of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam and show how the murderer’s group
membership was a central point of contention. While politicians framed the gen-
eral Muslim population as being on the inside, a group connected to the victim
emphasized the connection between the murderer and Muslims in general.16 The
specification of the group background in the dominant frames after attacks may be
important in shaping out-group trust.
The framing of attacks also may affect trust by underlining the importance
of trust as a moral obligation. As mentioned above, there is often an emphasis
on returning to normal and defying fear after terrorism. Maintaining the moral
obligation to trust, even toward out-groups related to terrorism, may be part of this
defiance. After right-wing extremist attacks, this also may be the case, as distrust
in out-groups is central to right-wing extremist ideology and conspiracy theories
(Fekete 2012).17 Thus, increasing trust in out-groups may be a way of rejecting
the terrorist ideology and as mentioned, Wollebæk, Enjolras, et al. (2012) and
Wollebæk, Steen-Johnsen, et al. (2013) find increased trust in out-groups after the
July 22, 2011 attacks in Norway.
The second research question concerns the effects on support for immigration
policy:
Research question 2. How do terrorist attacks affect immigration policy prefer-
ences?
Much research has been devoted to terrorism’s effects on attitudes toward im-
migrants and immigration, and a central finding in extant literature on terrorism
is the negative effect on attitudes toward minorities, with more ethnocentrism
and prejudice observed after terrorist attacks (Davis 2007, pp. 215-217; Kam and
Kinder 2007). Such attacks increase both negativity toward immigrants and per-
ceptions of a threat from immigration (Finseraas, Jakobsson, and Kotsadam 2011;
Legewie 2013; Schüller 2016). However, evidence of an effect on immigration-
policy preferences is more mixed, with some previous studies finding effects and
16 The lack of finding of an effect of the murder on immigration policy preferences in the
Netherlands by Finseraas, Jakobsson, and Kotsadam (2011) may be a consequence of the first of
these frames.
17 Right-wing extremist ideology is often intolerant of all types of deviance from what the
extremists view as “normal”, reflected in hatred for the LGBT-community and people with disabil-
ities.
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others finding no effects from terrorism on support for immigration policy (Finser-
aas, Jakobsson, and Kotsadam 2011; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Merolla and
Zechmeister 2009). This is puzzling, as support for immigration policy generally
has been found to be determined by perceptions of threats to society from immi-
gration (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins
2014, 2015), so one would expect policy support to follow changes in attitudes
toward immigrants.
Heightened perceptions of a threat do not automatically lead to changes in pol-
icy preferences. Extant research on anxiety shows that while anxious individuals
support security policies to a higher extent than others, this support depends on
the policies being interpreted as creating security (Albertson and Gadarian 2015,
p. 5). Thus, the effects of terrorism on immigration policy preferences should
be dependent on the framing of these policies. Research by Lahav and Courte-
manche (2012), which found that reading about terrorism in a survey experiment
increased support for strict immigration measures may support such a mechanism.
Their experiment explicitly mentions the possible immigration of terrorists, thereby
framing the terrorist threat as one connected to immigration. The effects of terror-
ism on attitudes toward immigration policy may be dependent on the framing of
the relevant policy and the prescriptions offered in the dominant framing of the
attacks.
As policies need to be relevant to receive increased support, it is probably
necessary for the group perpetrating the attacks to be connected to immigration.
Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) find increased perceptions of a threat from terror-
ism after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, but do not find increased support for
restricting immigration. This may be explained by a lack of relevance of immi-
gration policy to creating security after the attacks, as the attacks were both far
away and part of the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India. The criteria are
not necessarily very strict, as immigration policy may be framed successfully as
relevant, even when the terrorist groups are only loosely connected to immigra-
tion, but this was not the case in the Mumbai example. Nevertheless, the threat
of right-wing extremist terrorism should not be expected to increase support for
restrictions on immigration.
Prior attitudes toward immigration may moderate the effects of terrorist attacks
on immigration attitudes. People often are biased in their reception of new infor-
mation, and certain groups may be motivated to disregard terrorist attacks (Karlsen
et al. 2017; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2008; Taber and Lodge 2006). For example,
Gadarian (2010) finds that threatening news makes U.S. Democrats less afraid
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of terrorism when they perceive the news as partisan, i.e., following the framing
of the rival Republican Party. The group background may be one such point of
contention. People may differ in their views of which group the terrorists belong
to. Thus, people who support a liberal immigration policy may be motivated to
view Islamic terrorist attacks as being unrelated to immigration. People with a
negative attitude toward immigration may be motivated to disregard the political
motivation of right-wing extremist terrorism. Since framing and interpretation of
terrorist attacks are not provided by the attacks themselves, different frames may
be available, and even when they are not dominant, they may be influential for
different sub-groups (e.g. the discussion of Hajer and Uitermark 2008, above).
It may even be that when the dominant frames prescribe a correct line of action,
it may strengthen such biases because of reactance from political pressure (S. S.
Brehm and J. W. Brehm 1981; Gadarian 2010).
The effects of prior attitudes may depend on the emotional effects of terrorism.
Emotional reactions may interact with prior attitudes, and anger and anxiety exert
very different effects on reasoning (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). People
who become anxious are prone to reconsider their prior attitudes and reduce their
reliance on heuristics (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2018). However, people who
become angry double down on their prior attitudes and feel more secure in their be-
liefs (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, and Foucault 2018). Thus, it is possible that terrorism
creates different types of reactions based on the emotions people experience after
terrorist attacks. This, again, may underline the effects of the terrorist framing, as
the framing may reduce and increase these emotional reactions (Iyer et al. 2014).
The third research question concerns support for counterterrorism measures:
Research question 3. How do terrorist attacks affect support for counterterrorism
measures?
Terrorism has been found to increase support for counterterrorism measures.
Extant research has found that the support for counterterrorism measures increases
under the threat from of terrorism and after real-world attacks (Bozzoli and Müller
2011; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, et al. 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber 2007).18
This may possibly reflect an increase in support for counterterrorism measures in
themselves, and also reflect reduced support for civil liberties under threat (Davis
and Silver 2004; Marcus, Sullivan, et al. 1995).
18 Mondak and Hurwitz (2012) find that the effects of terrorism are similar to the effects of crime
in general, and while there is higher support for security measures under the threat of terrorism, the
difference from crime is not substantial.
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Similar to immigration-policy preferences, support for security measures seems
to be dependent on framing (Brinson and Stohl 2012), especially that the measures
are framed as protection from the threat. Haider-Markel, Joslyn, and Al-Baghal
(2006) find that reminding people of different types of terrorist threats increases
support for counterterrorism measures, but only for policies that are relevant to the
specific threats. The effect of threat on counterterrorism measures does not seem
to be a general preference for security measures, but rather an effect on support
for measures to provide protection from the threat (e.g. the null finding of the far
away terrorist attack in Mumbai in Finseraas and Listhaug 2013). The effects from
actual terrorist attacks on counterterrorism measures also seem to be dependent
on the framing of the attacks. Bozzoli and Müller (2011) find increased support
for security measures in Great Britain after the 7/7 London attacks. This increase
was not immediate, but developed over time and this could point to an effect on
the political debate after the attacks. In Norway, evidence points to less support
for security measures after the 2011 attacks, possibly caused by the emphasis on
“openness” and “democracy” in the dominant frame of the attacks (Fimreite et al.
2013). Thus, the effects of terrorist attacks on attitudes may be dependent on the
framing of policies in the aftermath of the attacks.
Support for counterterrorism measures may be dependent on the groups that are
targeted. If the increase in support is dependent on the measures being perceived
as protective, the effect may be strongest for measures either targeting the terrorist
group or for more general security measures. Support for civil liberties has been
found to vary by group background. Groups that are threatening (Marcus, Sullivan,
et al. 1995), or are perceived as not supporting democracy (Sniderman et al. 2014)
are tolerated to a lesser degree than others. Thus, support for targeting groups
that perpetrate terrorism may be higher because these groups are threatening and
because it may be perceived as an effective protective measure.
Few studies have looked directly at the importance of the target group. Chris-
tensen and Aars (2017) find, in a survey experiment, that people distinguish be-
tween different groups and that measures targeting groups that are threatening
(e.g., Islamic fundamentalists and right-wing extremists) are supported more than
measures targeting more democratic groups (e.g., Muslims). Piazza (2015) asks
people about what the police should do with the perpetrators of an attack in a
survey experiment and does not find a difference in support for jailing Muslims
relative to Islamic fundamentalist perpetrators. In this case, both the Muslims and
Islamic fundamentalists are described as having already perpetrated a terrorist at-
tack, possibly reducing the perceived difference between the groups. He does find
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higher support for prolonged imprisonment of Muslim and Islamic fundamental-
ist perpetrators relative to right-wing extremist perpetrators something that could
reflect the general finding of lower support for measures that target oneself (Best,
Krueger, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2011; Sun, Wu, and Poteyeva 2011; Viscusi
and Zeckhauser 2003). Thus, it remains unclear how terrorist attacks change the
relative support between targeting different groups. People may be expected to
show greater support for targeting the group perpetrating the attacks, for targeting
out-groups, and for targeting threatening groups relative to democratic groups,
but a central question is whether terrorist attacks reduce the difference between
Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists, as could be expected from the findings by
Piazza (2015).
Finally, prior attitudes have been found to influence the effect of the threat
of terrorism on attitudes toward counterterrorism measures, but this research has
found different effects from the same attitudes, both arguing that terrorism affects
more liberal and more conservative groups the most. One strand of research has
followed Stenner (2005), and studied how threat mobilizes authoritarians or makes
non-authoritarian people more authoritarian. While Cohrs et al. (2005) and Kos-
sowska et al. (2011) find that threat reinforces the effects of authoritarianism,
Hetherington and Suhay (2011) find that threat reduces the differences between
the groups and that non-authoritarians become more similar to authoritarians under
threat. Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) and Malhotra and Popp (2012) similarly
find that threat affects Democrats and liberals more than Republicans and conser-
vatives. According to Vasilopoulos, Marcus, and Foucault (2018) however, both
of these mechanisms may be in play at the same time. While threat mobilized
right-wing respondents’ authoritarianism through anger, anxiety make left-wing
respondents reevaluate their views and become more authoritarian.
Research design
Cases
The three papers study three different cases. The first two use two different terrorist
attacks as starting points, while the last study is based on a survey experiment. The
first paper studies the July 22, 2011, attacks in Norway. These attacks were, in
many ways extraordinary. They were very lethal relative to other right-wing attacks
(Ravndal 2017) and were perpetrated by a lone terrorist who, unlike the usual “lone
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wolf”, did not have any contact with other groups while he planned the attacks
(Schuurman et al. 2018).
With the current dearth of studies looking into the effects of non-Islamic ter-
rorist attacks, these attacks may be useful as a comparison case for the effects of
terrorism. Indeed, if the terrorists’ backgrounds were irrelevant, the July 22 attacks
could have been assumed to have the same types of effects as Islamic terrorism
based on the number of casualties. The July 22 attacks provide an interesting case
for studying the importance of the group background of terrorists, as well as for
studying the effects of the political response. The Norwegian reaction seemed dif-
ferent from other political reactions to terrorism, and the dominant framing used
by the prime minister, in the media and in the public demonstrations, was very
different from the “War on Terror”-frame. Finally, the attacks also were directly
connected to Norwegian politics through both the terrorist’s political ideas and
his former membership in the youth wing of one of the main political parties and
may give important insight into how prior attitudes moderate the effects of terrorist
attacks.
The second paper studies the case of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher
attacks in Paris in January 2015. These terrorists had a clear Islamic motivation for
attacking the Charlie Hebdo headquarters, namely the “blasphemy” of the paper’s
cartoons, although the attacks were on a smaller scale than some other Islamic
attacks. The attacks are interesting here because of the following political and
societal response. The political elites, media, and public framed the attacks as
attacks on the French Republic and republican values. The emphasis on the value
of “laïcité”, the special form of French secularism that encompasses a tolerance
for different religions, could have led to a more tolerant reaction to the attacks in
France. Using data on France and six other European countries, it is possible to
compare the reactions to the same attacks in France and the other countries. This
is crucial, as comparing the effects of the framing of two different terrorist attacks
is difficult because other possible differences between the attacks may affect the
attacks’ consequences.
The third paper uses a survey experiment that was fielded in four countries.
These countries – the US, France, Norway, and Finland – differ in their history
of terrorist violence and in the nature of certain recent attacks. While France and
the US have a recent history of large-scale Islamic terrorism, Norway has only
experienced right-wing extremist terrorism, and Finland primarily has experienced
school shootings. These differing experiences are especially relevant, as the ex-
periment tests differences in the support for targeting different social groups with
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counterterrorism measures. The four countries also differ on other characteristics
that may affect support for counterterrorism measures. While the two Nordic coun-
tries have high levels of both social and political trust, such trust levels in the other
two countries are lower. While social trust reduces support for counterterrorism,
political trust increases such support. Thus, including including countries with
both high and low levels of support may be important for the findings’ generaliz-
ability.
The three papers study both Islamic and right-wing extremist terrorism, but
the third paper explicitly compares the effects of the two types of terrorism. By
comparing the effects of different types of terrorism, it is possible to separate the
general effects of terrorism from the effects of specific subtypes. This comparison
facilitates testing the applicability of the proposed framework concerning the im-
portance of terrorists’ group background and ideology. Through this comparison,
the thesis also explores the generalizability of the inferences already found from
the case of Islamic terrorism. This is a timely contribution to a field of research
that has been preoccupied with Islamic terrorism, and in many ways, started with
the ascendancy of Islamic terrorism to the top of the international agenda after
9/11.
Method and data
The three papers use three different surveys. The first paper is based on the panel
of social media users from the project “Social Media and the New Public Sphere —
Consequences for Democracy and Citizenship.” This panel was fielded in the
spring of 2011 and then contacted again in August 2011, one month after the
July 22 attacks. The second paper uses the seventh round of the European Social
Survey (ESS 2014). This is a large comparative survey and the seventh round
was fielded in 21 European countries. The third paper uses a survey experiment
developed in collaboration with other members of the Disruptive Events Project.
The resulting survey was fielded in five countries, Finland, France, Norway, Spain
and the U.S.
Studying terrorist attacks with survey data is difficult, as the timing of attacks
is unknown beforehand. Therefore, to study the effects of attacks, researchers
often have relied on surveys fielded in the aftermath of attacks. These surveys may
provide important information about the aftermaths of terrorism, but correlational
studies after events may suffer from reverse causality or omitted variable bias
and are, therefore, unable to distinguish the consequences of attacks from more
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general correlations. The study by Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) exemplifies
this problem. They find a correlation between threat perception and immigration
attitudes in their cross-sectional data after 9/11, but they also use panel data and find
that changes in threat perception over time do not predict changes in immigration
attitudes. Thus, the correlation between threat and immigration attitudes does not
reflect a causal relationship between the two attitudes, which could have been their
assumption without the panel-data component of their analysis. This thesis uses
three different methodological approaches to establish the causal effects of terrorist
attacks and threats.
The first paper uses panel data, in which the first round ended approximately
three months before the attacks on July 22, 2011, and the second round was fielded
about a month after the attacks.19 This panel can be used to examine how prior
attitudes determine reactions to attacks, something that is impossible with cross-
sectional data in which everyone has been “treated” by an attack. In this paper,
the panel data are complemented with questions from the second round (after the
attacks). These questions concern the perceived effect of the attacks on ethnic
tensions, free speech, and togetherness. Using these questions means that parts
of the analysis may be exposed to some of the problems cited above. The results
from the study of prior attitudes are possibly more robust than the results using
questions concerning evaluations of the political and societal response to the at-
tacks. While the results from this part of the study should be treated with some
caution, they reflect a central problem in studying the effects of the societal and po-
litical responses to terrorism. In studying how the response affected attitudes and
what parts of the response were important, it is difficult not to use “post-treatment”
measures. Without controlling the treatment and exposure to the political response
(see Paper 2), it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the political
response and the individual’s changes in attitudes
The second paper comes closer to identifying the causal effect of the political
response. This paper combines two different strategies for causal inference. First,
it studies the Charlie Hebdo attacks through a modified regression-discontinuity
design, which relies on the random timing of interviews in large-scale surveys and
has been used extensively in studies on terrorism (see e.g., Finseraas, Jakobsson,
and Kotsadam 2011; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Jakobsson and Blom 2014;
Legewie 2013). The paper also goes further than prior studies in that it follows
Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015), explicitly testing the balance of the before
19 This round was fielded to gauge the effects of the attacks and contained several questions
concerning the perceived effects of the attacks.
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and after groups in the different regions and only include balanced regions. This
is done in smaller regional areas (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
or NUTS). In the balanced regions, the effect of the attacks is estimated based
on a comparison of means, then aggregated to the nation level (Gerber and Green
2012, pp. 72-73). This method differs from earlier studies that primarily relied
on parametric modeling of time trends in the data, rather than excluding areas in
which balance does not hold.
The second strategy for causal inference is used to distinguish the effect of the
French societal response. As the French political framing of the attacks probably
affected the French public more strongly than people in other countries, the dif-
ference between the estimated effects in France and six other countries is used to
show the effect of the French framing and response to the attacks. This method has
its strength in that it estimates the causal effect of the French response, but because
other attitudes may have been affected by the attacks, it is not possible to use these
attitudes to study what part of the French framing and political response created
this separate effect, as is done in the first paper.20 The ESS includes questions
on both Muslim immigration and other types of immigration, such as Jewish and
Roma immigration. It is accordingly possible to use the data to compare the effects
on attitudes toward the immigration by different groups. Thus, the second paper
provides insight into the importance of the group background of the terrorist as
well.
The general importance of group background is difficult to test using surveys
after real attacks, which are perpetrated by one type of group, and using a compar-
ison of two different attacks to compare the effect of group background is difficult
because attacks usually vary in characteristics other than the group background,
e.g., political reaction. Thus, it is difficult to establish the specific effect of different
group backgrounds. To study the effects of group background, the third paper uses
a survey experiment. In the experiment, the respondents read a threatening news
story and answer questions about security measures targeting one group. Both the
groups perpetrating terrorism in the news stories and the groups targeted by secu-
rity measures are randomized. This opens up analyses on the importance of both
the group background of terrorists and the group targeted by security measures,
20 See Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres (2018) for a discussion of the problems of conditioning
on post-treatment variables. The difference between the findings in paper 2 and those by Castanho
Silva (2018) could to a certain extent be a consequence of his inclusion of self-placement on the left-
right axis as an independent variable. As research has found that terrorism affects self-placement
on this scale (Berrebi and Klor 2008), something that seems to be the case in table 1 of his paper
as well, including this independent variable may under-estimate the effects of the attacks.
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as well as whether it is important that these two groups are the same or not. In
addition, as it is possible to ask about attitudes before the treatment starts, the ex-
periment facilitates testing on the moderating effects of prior attitudes. Compared
with other papers, the use of experimental treatment increases internal validity, as
the researcher completely controls the treatment. External validity, i.e., the gener-
alizability of the findings, is less clear. The central question concerns what can be
compared with the treatment. In this case, the treatment is reading a news story
concerning an imminent terrorist threat. In the current situation, this should not
be a very uncommon experience, but it remains unclear how the effects of reading
these stories relate to the effects of a terrorist attack, and while one can assume
them to be weaker, they also could be qualitatively different.
Each of the three different methodological designs has strengths and weak-
nesses. The panel design in the first paper has two important strengths. On the one
hand, it is possible to measure the moderating effects of prior attitudes. On the
other, it measures respondents’ interpretations of the attacks and at the same time
has information on attitudes before the attacks. However, the longer time between
the measurements may lead to omitted variable bias, and one such problem could
be the start of the political campaigns before the Norwegian local elections in the
autumn of the same year. While the electoral campaigns usually do not start this
early in Norway, it is not possible to eliminate the possibility of an effect from
such parallel events. The second paper reduces the time span significantly, so this
is less of a problem, but the comparison of the effects in the different countries
may suffer from a similar problem, as there could be parallel events that affect
only respondents in one country. In addition, while the study’s method makes
causal inferences possible, it is unable to gauge people’s perceptions of the attacks
directly. Finally, the third study, a survey experiment, comes closest to measuring
a valid causal effect, but it is harder to establish the generalizability of the findings.
It’s not entirely clear what phenomena can be compared with the newspaper stories.
In addition, while the effects of the newspaper stories lasted through some other
survey questions, it is impossible to know the long-term effects of such a treatment.
The short time span is a major limitation of these studies, as it is impossible to
study whether the effects are long-lasting or just short-term changes in opinions.
Thus, identifying the long-term effects of terrorism falls outside the scope of this
thesis. As will be described below, the consequences of short-term changes in
opinion also may elicit important long-term consequences if they lead to changes
in policy.
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Structure of the thesis
Paper 1: Øyvind Bugge Solheim (2018). “Right-Wing Terrorism
and Out-Group Trust” In: Terrorism and Political Violence
The first paper uses the Norwegian reaction to the July 22, 2011, attacks to study
the effects of terrorism on out-group trust. A right-wing extremist carried out the
attacks. He had once been a member of the youth wing of the Progress Party — the
party most strongly opposed to immigration of the mainstream Norwegian parties.
Thus, the attacks had a direct connection to both the political cleavage on immigra-
tion and to this political party, making it an interesting case for studying how prior
attitudes affect reactions to terrorism. Moreover, following the attacks, the main
frame that political leaders, the media, and public commemorations employed
emphasized democratic values such as “openness,” “democracy,” and “tolerance.”
Greater public support for immigration (Jakobsson and Blom 2014)) and stronger
out-group trust (Wollebæk, Enjolras, et al. 2012; Wollebæk, Steen-Johnsen, et
al. 2013) also were reported. The paper explores how both prior attitudes and
perceptions of public reactions affected out-group trust.
People reported more trust in people with a different religion and those with
different nationalities after the attacks.21 Earlier studies suggested that similar
changes in other attitudes may have been caused by people with attitudes in line
with those of the terrorist experiencing cognitive dissonance (Jakobsson and Blom
2014). Because of such dissonance, these groups, in turn, changed attitudes so that
they veered away from the terrorist’s attitudes. Paper 1’s findings do not support
such a mechanism. Ideological similarity is inversely related to change in trust, and
the group that could be labeled the terrorist’s “imagined constituency” experienced
a smaller trust increase than others.
Drawing on the framework outlined above, there seems to be an effect of
both prior attitudes and of the framing of the attacks.22 Beginning with the effects
of framing, the increase in out-group trust was connected to perceptions of the
political consequences of the attacks. People who perceived the aftermath of the
attacks as being characterized by lower levels of ethnic differences experienced
21 Even after the right-wing extremist attacks, perceptions of threat from terrorism after the
attacks was however connected to lower trust in out-groups. This could be interpreted both as
reflecting the salient connection between Muslims and terrorism and reflecting a negative effect of
threat in general on trust.
22 One could have seen it as only an effect of the ideological background of the terrorist, but the
analyses reveals that the attacks had different effects on different people .
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a bigger increase in trust than others. Interestingly, more general experiences of
increased “togetherness” were not connected to the increase. The interpretation
of this as an effect from the framing of the attacks is supported by the finding
of a negative effect of not being able to express one’s own opinions. People
who were not in agreement with the general framing after the attacks and who
experienced fewer opportunities to express their opinions experienced a smaller
trust increase than others. Secondly, those with the most positive attitudes toward
immigration before the attacks experienced the largest increase in trust. People
who had negative attitudes toward immigration or who identified with the Progress
Party experienced a smaller trust increase than the others. This may reflect both
motivated reasoning in the in the interpretation of the attacks and “reactance” to
the political framing after the attacks (S. S. Brehm and J. W. Brehm 1981).
Paper 2: Øyvind Bugge Solheim - “Are we all Charlie? The in-
ternational and domestic effects of terrorism.” Manuscript
The second paper follows up on the findings of a positive effect from the framing
of the attacks in Norway. While the first paper found a positive effect from framing
on out-group trust, this could have been contingent on the right-wing extremist
background of the terrorist perpetrating that attack. The second paper studies how
the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks affected immigration preferences
in France and in six other countries. It asks whether the French framing of the
attacks led to a different reaction in France than in the other countries. This may
be viewed as a least-likely case because the framing offered by central French
politicians, elites, and the public broke with the dominant the “War on terror”
frame. The framing of the attacks emphasized French “republican values” such as
“laïcité”, the French value of inclusive secularism. While these values resonated
in France, they were relatively unknown outside of France before the attacks, and
in addition the media coverage of an attack tends to be stronger inside the country
attacked. Thus, the framing of the attacks probably affected French people more
than people in other countries.
The results show that the attacks had no impact on immigration preferences in
France. This could have been interpreted as a consequence of the attacks being
too discriminate in their target or too small to affect the French public, but the
massive demonstrations across France after the attacks indicate that French people,
indeed, were affected. The paper also finds that the attacks led to an increase
in support for restrictions on immigration outside France. The data allow for a
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comparison of the attacks’ effects on attitudes toward different groups. Thus, it is
possible to test whether the terrorist’s Islamic background led to a more specific
effect from the attacks. The attack on the Hyper Cacher, a kosher supermarket
in Paris, directly targeted Jews, something that could have increased sympathy
toward this group. Distinguishing from among different types of immigration
shows how the attacks had a negative impact on attitudes toward both Muslims
and Jewish immigration outside of France, but not inside the country. This could
be interpreted as a consequence of out-group denigration caused by the increased
mortality salience after terrorism, but a possible second interpretation is that the
attacks reduced support for immigration in general and that this spilled over into
attitudes toward Jewish immigration as well.
Paper 3: Øyvind Bugge Solheim - “All or None? A Four-Country
Experiment on How the Threat of Terrorism Affects Support for
Counterterrorism Measures.” Manuscript
The third paper delves further into the importance of terrorists’ group background
and ideology, as well as the public’s prior attitudes. A survey experiment covering
the US, France, Norway and Finland is used to study these effects from the terrorist
threat on attitudes toward counterterrorism measures. Extant studies have found
that terrorist attacks increase support for stricter security measures and reduce
the defense of civil liberties, but it is unclear whether the changes in support are
dependent on the target of the measures or the group in question. In the experiment,
the respondents read either a fictional news story that described a terrorism threat
or a control story. Three terrorism stories were used where only the terrorist group
varied – either Islamic or right-wing extremists. Afterward, respondents answered
questions about counterterrorism measures where the target group varied across
the terrorist stories.
The analyses show that people distinguish from among different groups, and
that support for targeting threatening or undemocratic groups is higher than the
support for targeting other groups (this dovetails with the findings by Christensen
and Aars 2017; Marcus, Sullivan, et al. 1995; Sniderman et al. 2014). Accord-
ingly, the respondents were more supportive of targeting right-wing extremists
and Islamists than they were of targeting Muslims. As was also hypothesized, the
threatening news stories increased support for counterterrorism measures. How
Islamic terrorism would affect support for targeting Muslims relative to Islamists
and right-wing extremists was not clear beforehand. On one hand, support for
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civil liberties, which may serve as a bulwark against illegitimate counterterrorism
measures, generally decreases under the threat of terrorism. On the other, anxiety
increases support for more specific measures that create protection from the cause
of the anxiety. The results show that the threatening news stories increased support
for targeting people in general, right-wing extremists, and Muslims regardless of
the terrorist group’s background in the story. Interestingly, only the Islamic news
story seemed to increase support for targeting Islamists. Norway also differed from
this general effect, with no effect and a negative estimate of the right-wing extrem-
ist news story on support for targeting Muslims. This could be a consequence
of the country’s experience with right-wing extremist terrorism and may indicate
lingering effects from the tolerant response to the 2011 attacks (see Paper 1).
Finally, support for immigration was negatively correlated with support for
counterterrorism efforts targeting Muslims, Islamists, and “people,” but not with
support for targeting right-wing extremists. Respondents who were very negative
toward immigration did not distinguish between Muslims and Islamists, and they
supported targeting both groups to a large extent. In addition, this group did not
become more supportive of targeting right-wing extremists after reading about
right-wing extremist terrorism. However, this news story did both increase the
group’s support for targeting “people” and increase the support for targeting right-
wing extremists among people with more moderate attitudes toward immigration.
People negative toward immigration thus seems to have reacted differently to the
experiment than others, possibly reflecting a reaction to being asked twice about
right-wing extremists.
Findings
This thesis examined the consequences of terrorism for three types of attitudes
related to out-groups. These attitudes may be viewed as connected to the threat
from terrorism. Terrorism may affect day-to-day interactions with other people as
taking precautionary measures toward groups connected with the threat may be
one way of creating protection from the threat. Out-group trust may decrease as a
consequence of the threat from terrorism. The state also may counter the threat at
the domestic level, and public support for domestic counterterrorism measures may
increase. Finally, the terrorist threat also may be perceived as increasing because
of immigration, leading to reductions in support for immigration after an attack.
The results of the three papers show that the generally negative effect of terror-
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ism on attitudes toward out-groups is contingent on other factors. This thesis has
proposed and tested the applicability of a political framework for understanding
these consequences from terrorist attacks. The framework diverges from most re-
cent research on the effects of terrorism by arguing that such effects are dependent
on factors other than the attacks themselves. Three papers illuminate this proposi-
tion from different angles, showing both where the results support the expectations
from the framework and where further development is needed.
The terrorist group
The first dimension of this framework is the importance of the group that per-
petrates an attack. One could expect that the group background would affect
terrorism’s effects on both attitudes toward the group and toward the group’s ideol-
ogy. The results are more mixed than expected. The first paper’s findings indicate
a reaction that considers both ethno-religious and political backgrounds. Thus,
the attacks, perpetrated by a white right-wing extremist, did not affect out-group
attitudes negatively, but rather increased trust in out-groups. While it is difficult
to establish the possible effects from the counter-factual situation of an Islamic
terrorist attack, the multiple cases of harassment of people thought to be Muslims
in the hours after the attacks seem to indicate that a tolerant reaction would not
necessarily have occurred (see Haarr and Partapuoli 2012).
The two other papers find mechanisms that are not as clear-cut. In the second
paper, a negative change in preferences toward Muslim immigration is found
outside France, but the attacks also affected attitudes toward Jewish immigration
negatively, even though Jews were a direct target during the attacks. This indicates
that terrorist attacks do not only affect attitudes toward groups connected to the
terrorists perpetrating the attacks, but also to other groups. Similarly, in the survey
experiment in Paper 3, the terrorist threat increases support for counterterrorism
measures, but it does so regardless of a connection between the group behind the
threat and the group that the measures target. Thus, support for counterterrorism
measures seems to increase even when people are reminded of a threat from a
different group.
One possible explanation is that the terrorist attacks and threatening news
stories affected people’s general policy preferences. People generally may have
become more negative toward immigration and more positive toward counter-
terrorism measures, which may have led to changes in preferences for policies
targeting specific groups. Thus, terrorist attacks could affect unrelated groups
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through their effects on policy measures in general. It is still unclear whether this
is generalizable to every type of group. Particularly in the experiment on support
for counterterrorism measures, one could argue that the “Muslims” group does
have a certain connection to terrorism. It is possible that the effects on support
would have been different had the respondents been asked about a group without
a clear terrorist connection.
Finally, some evidence indicates that a country’s prior experience with terror-
ism may affect reactions toward renewed threats. A red line exists between the
findings in the analyses of the Norwegian respondents in Papers 1 and 3. In Paper
1, the July 22, 2011, attacks in Norway by a right-wing extremist are found to
lead to higher out-group trust. In the third paper, while the right-wing-extremist
news story made people more supportive of counterterrorism measures against
both right-wing extremists and Muslims in three other countries, this was not the
case in Norway. The news story did not increase support for targeting Muslims,
and the estimated direction of the insignificant effect is negative. This may indicate
that being reminded of right-wing extremist terrorism in Norway had a different
effect than in the other countries because Norwegians had experience with framing
right-wing extremist terrorism as connected to a prescription for tolerance. These
results are still early indications, but such effects, and creation of “collective mem-
ories” about terrorism, may be an interesting avenue to explore further (Rothstein
2000).
Framing
The effects of terrorism also seem to be dependent on the political framing. Paper
1 contains clear indications that perceptions of the 2011 attacks’ aftermath affected
the effects from the attacks. People who experienced society as characterized
by less ethnic antagonism strengthened their trust in out-groups after the attacks
more than others. Since this finding was based on a case of right-wing extremist
terrorism, inferences made from the case were possibly not generalizable to Islamic
terrorist attacks. The second paper finds no change in preferences on immigration
policy in France after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. The finding of a negative effect
in other European countries indicates that nothing was inherent in the attacks that
made the reaction become more tolerant. Rather, the framing that dominated the
political reaction and broad mobilization of French society after the attacks seem
to have affected attitudinal consequences as well.
The findings here show some of the limits to the effects of framing. First, the
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framing of an attack may be constrained to the country suffering the attack (e.g.
Brinson and Stohl 2009). The French reaction to the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper
attacks was not copied outside of France. The reactions in the other countries
seem to have followed the negative reaction toward out-groups that has been found
in many other cases. With the “War on terror” as an international macro frame,
it may be difficult to frame attacks differently. For political entrepreneurs to be
successful in such attempts at framing, it may be that they need the special context
of an aftermath of domestic terrorist attacks. As discussed above, in the aftermaths
of terrorist attacks, the behavior of the media, opposition, and public changes in
directions that are conducive to framing by central politicians
The finding of an effect from framing on trust in out-groups was somewhat un-
expected. The principal proposed mechanism through which framings of terrorist
attacks were thought to affect attitudes was through the effects from anxiety on
support for protective policies and not on trust. That the framing in Norway led
to increased levels of out-group trust seems to reflect a moral commitment to trust
that could be activated by a dominant frame after attacks. This mechanism differs
from the proposed mechanism behind increases in generalized social trust under
galvanizing crises or collective experiences (Putnam 2000, ch. 24; Sander and Put-
nam 2009, p. 408; Uslaner 2002, p. 189). While Putnam (2000, ch. 24) views these
crises as creating opportunities for collective action, which, in turn, fosters trust,
Uslaner (2002, p. 189) writes about the effects from heightened perceptions of
community sentiment and similarity with others. However, no correlation between
experienced togetherness and out-group trust is apparent in Norway, indicating low
support for an effect based on heightened perceptions of community and similarity.
The findings here may implicate another mechanism, one in which trust can be
activated through framing. This effect could on the one hand be seen in light of
Uslaner’s (2002) view of generalized trust as a moral obligation and that this moral
obligation became activated by the framing of the attacks. A second possibility
is more group specific. Large groups in the West both have prejudiced attitudes
toward out-groups and have internalized a social norm against prejudice (Blinder,
Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013). One possible interpretation is thus that the framing
of the attacks increased the salience of these anti-prejudice norms and reduced the
expressed prejudice. Accordingly, the framing of the attacks may have increased
Norwegians’ motivation to control prejudice.
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Prior attitudes
Prior attitudes seem to moderate the effects of terrorism, but this effect is closely
connected to the two other parts of the framework. It is in the reception of frames
and in the evaluation of terrorist groups that prior attitudes seem to have the
strongest effects. This follows from the discussion of the effects of terrorism
and the lack of information available to the public after an attack. If prior attitudes
primarily affect the reception of information (e.g., through motivated reasoning),
there is reason to expect that it would moderate the effects of the information
available to the public, namely the framing and the group background.
The importance of terrorist groups seems to vary with prior attitudes. In the
third paper, when people read news stories about terrorism, both about right-wing
extremist and Islamist terrorism, their support for targeting right-wing extremists
with counterterrorism measures increased. This was not the case for people with
negative attitudes toward immigration when they were asked about right-wing ex-
tremists and read the right-wing extremist news story. The right-wing extremist
news story decreased this group’s support for counterterrorism measures that tar-
geted right-wing extremists. People with negative attitudes toward immigration
seem to have rejected the experimental treatment. While this could be attributed
to the experimental setting, it is also possible that the strength of the treatment,
i.e., being exposed to right-wing extremists twice, made the respondents who were
ideologically close to this group reject the treatment. This resembles the findings
from the effects of framing above.
The effects of frames also are dependent on prior attitudes. Not everyone
seems to be affected to the same extent (and maybe in the same way) by the
frames. These findings follow the research on politically motivated reasoning and
the biased reception of new information (Karlsen et al. 2017; Taber, Cann, and
Kucsova 2008; Taber and Lodge 2006). The extreme coverage of terrorism in
the media and the broad mobilizations in the public may be expected to lead to
a strong, dominant frame on groups that are positively inclined to the frame’s
message and at the same time, as well as to “reactance” by some groups (S. S.
Brehm and J. W. Brehm 1981). Generally, when people feel that their freedom
is threatened, they are prone to try to protect it. This reaction may be induced by
experiences of pressure to conform after terrorist attacks. People who disagree
with the prescriptions of the dominant frame may react to the pressure to conform
by trying to reestablish their freedom (e.g., findings by Gadarian 2013). In the
Norwegian case, while the majority followed the increase in tolerance, this was
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not the case for certain sub-groups and varied with prior attitudes.
Limitations and future research
The effects found here are studied in a short time period after the terrorist attacks,
and the papers are unable to capture how long these effects last. It is thus possible
that the effects of terrorism found in the three papers are short-term effects that do
not last over longer periods of time. This is an important limitation to this study.
As has been argued above however, even short-term effects of terrorist attacks
on attitudes may make policy changes possible by changing the “politics stream”
(Kingdon 2014, p. 96). This argument is strengthened by the findings of an effect
of political framing as political leaders are crucial in setting the dominant frames.
Accordingly, political leaders seem to have greater leeway in implementing re-
forms in the aftermath of terrorism than in other settings. Whether there are effects
on policy is an empirical question that should be studied further (see also Epifanio
2011, 2016). This could also lead to interesting studies of feedback loops between
policies and attitudes, and Brooks and Manza (2013, pp. 132-138) do find that
people become more positive toward surveillance measures when reminded that
the policies are legal.
While the papers have indicated that there may be a separate effect of the
framing of terrorist attacks, this still leaves the question of why a certain frame
was chosen. To what extent were the frames that were chosen after the attacks
in France and Norway dependent on specifics of the attacks themselves? The
French attacks were for example more discriminate in their targeting and had
fewer casualties than some of the other attacks that followed in France, and the
reaction by the same political leadership to the later attacks seemed very different
and more belligerent. The choices of framing made by the political leaders in face
of an attack are thus an interesting topic for further research.
A related limitation is that the effects of framing are not studied directly. While
the findings in the first two papers indicate an effect of the framing of the attacks,
further research is needed to establish the effects of framing of attacks on attitudes.
The two studies by Brinson and Stohl (2009, 2012) are one interesting approach.
These authors first found two different types of terrorism frames and then tested the
effects of the two frames in a survey experiment finding effects of only one of the
frames on support for counterterrorism measures. Further testing both of different
frames and of the possibility of recreating effects by reminding people of earlier
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frames could yield interesting results. In the third paper, people increased support
for targeting Muslims after reading about right-wing extremist terrorism in three of
the countries, but not in Norway. This could indicate an effect of being reminded
of the framing of the July 22, 2011 attacks something that could be interesting to
test further in experiments.
The thesis’ focus on attitudes and not behavior is also a limitation. The harass-
ment of “Muslims” in Norway after the July 22 attacks shows that attacks may lead
to changes in behavior as well (Haarr and Partapuoli 2012) and Gautier, Siegmann,
and Van Vuuren (2009) found that the Theo van Gogh murder in Amsterdam in
2004 changed behavior in the housing market of the city, even though Finseraas,
Jakobsson, and Kotsadam (2011) found no effect on attitudes toward immigration
policy in the Netherlands. While attitudinal changes could be expected to lead to
changes in behavior, this is not given. The positive effects on out-group trust in
Norway were for example not reflected in reduced discrimination in the Norwe-
gian labor market (Birkelund et al. 2018). The relationship between changes in
attitudes and changes in behavior after terrorist attacks is thus an interesting topic
of study.
Conclusion
In the beginning of this chapter, negative effects from terrorism on democracy were
outlined. Through their actions, terrorists were hypothesized to create reactions
toward related groups that breaks with central democratic values. The threat from
terrorism on democracy has been a red thread through much of the research since
9/11. The problematic effects from these attacks on out-group attitudes have set
a standard for how terrorism is thought to affect attitudes, and terrorism has been
found to affect a broad set of out-group attitudes.
This thesis has proposed a more nuanced view of the effects of terrorism and
the mechanisms through which terrorist attacks affect democratic societies. While
both direct and indirect effects from the threat of terrorism may exist, the argument
here is that the effects from attacks may be contingent on terrorists’ characteristics,
the framings of attacks, and people’s prior attitudes. Thus, this perspective shows
that limits may exist on the generalizability of extant literature to attacks that other
types of groups perpetrate, that elicit other types of framings and that are connected
to other types of domestic political cleavages. The findings in the extant research
may set expectations on the effects of Islamic attacks in which the reaction follows
37
the “War on Terror” framing, but may not be applicable to other types of terrorist
attacks or other types of framings.
This thesis, in many ways, paints a more optimistic picture than extant research.
The effects from terrorism are not provided directly through an attack, but members
of the elite frame attacks and can affect public reaction to terrorism through such
framing. Through the actions of politicians, the media and the public, democracies
may indeed resist some of the negative effects of threat. The papers here show
that it is possible to mobilize the public around tolerant values even after terrorist
attacks.
The emphasis on framing leads to a less-negative view of the media as well.
Earlier research provided a view of the media similar to Thatcher’s description
of publicity as “oxygen” for the terrorists, or described the media as having a
symbiotic relationship with terrorism. However, this thesis argues that while the
media coverage of terrorism may be problematic, the mass media also plays an
important role in facilitating political leadership, something that is crucial in the
aftermath of terrorism (see also Wilkinson 1997). Thus, the media serve a dual
role in the aftermath of terrorism. On one hand, they cover (often extensively)
terrorists’ atrocities. On the other hand, they gives political leaders the opportunity
to guide the public’s interpretation of attacks.
The flip side of this optimistic view is not very different from the story that
extant research has told. If terrorism gives the government leeway in framing the
reaction to it, no reason exists to believe that only one framing is available —
one based on tolerance and love for civil liberties. Indeed, the findings in the
extant research seems to confirm that this is not the case and these values were
not emphasized in the “War on Terror” framing. Thus, the effects of terrorism on
the status of out-groups in Western society may depend on the preferences of the
political leaders and the governing parties more than on terrorism itself.
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ABSTRACT
Terrorist attacks often lead to public backlashes. Following the
attacks on July 22, 2011 in Norway, Norwegians showed support for
democratic values such as “openness,” “democracy,” and “tolerance”
in the public debate and in the commemorations across the country.
They also reported higher out-group trust. This paper explores two
possible reasons for this increase in trust using a unique panel fielded
before and right after the attacks. The first is that cognitive disso-
nance led people to dissociate from the terrorist and his ideology.
The second is that the increase in trust was a response to the public
backlash after the attacks. The increase in trust was not caused by
cognitive dissonance. Rather, people who were already positive
towards immigration, or who saw positive effects of the attacks,
became more trusting than others did, and Progress Party supporters
increased their trust less than others. These findings are interpreted
as a response to the attacks and the political characteristics of the
backlash. The study concludes by discussing implications for our
understanding of the different consequences of attacks for the ter-
rorists’ imagined constituencies and for the broader public.
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Terrorists are often motivated by a wish to increase publicity and support for their cause.
The effectiveness of this so-called “propaganda by the deed” is, however, doubtful.1
Terrorist attacks usually lead to negative backlashes in democratic societies, both against
the terrorists themselves and against accommodating their demands.2 These backlashes
and the following lower levels of support in the public have at times even led to the demise
of terrorist groups.3 However, few have studied the effects of terrorism on the support for
the terrorists’ cause by different groups.4 Using the case of the attacks on July 22, 2011 in
Norway, this paper asks whether the terrorist attacks led to a negative reaction towards the
ideology of the terrorists and if so, whether this varied between groups with different prior
attitudes.
On July 22, 2011, a right-wing extremist perpetrated a dual terrorist attack, bombing
the office of the Labor Party Prime Minister in Oslo and massacring members of the youth
wing of the Labor Party at their summer camp. In total, 77 people were killed and many
were wounded in the first large-scale terrorist attacks on Norwegian soil. The terrorist sent
out a political manifesto to different media outlets before committing the attacks, in which
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he outlined his ideas and his belief in a grand Muslim conspiracy.5 In the public, the
attacks were mainly seen as attacks on Norwegian democracy, but Norwegian media also
reported on the Labor Party background of the victims and the terrorist’s former Progress
Party membership.6 The Norwegian response to the attacks was similar to other back-
lashes against terrorism, with a strong rally around the political leadership, the media
preoccupied with rebuilding the national community, and large commemorations across
the country. Almost one-third of the Norwegian population participated in what became
known as the “Rose Marches,” showing sympathy for the victims and support for demo-
cratic values.
The attacks influenced the public’s attitudes and Norwegians became more positive
towards out-groups after the attacks.7 Research has explained this change in attitudes
towards out-groups as caused by the “black sheep effect” and a possible dissociation from
the terrorist’s extreme right-wing ideology.8 However, the change in attitudes may also
have been a response to the political mobilization of Norwegian society during the
backlash to the attacks.9
The attacks and the public response
In the early afternoon of July 22, 2011, the terrorist set off a car bomb in front of the
Prime Minister’s offices in the center of Oslo.10 Because this was during the summer
vacation, there were few casualties in spite of the extensive damages to the governmental
offices in the area. The public originally believed that it was Islamic terrorism, and in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks there were multiple examples of harassment of people
perceived to be Muslims.11 However, during the hours following the bombing it first
became clear that the terrorist was a white male, before the news broke of a shooting on
the island of Utøya. On the island, AUF, the youth wing of the Labor Party, were having
their annual summer camp. Youth from all over Norway were participating in political
workshops and debates, listening to speeches by politicians, and engaging in several other
non-political activities. The terrorist came armed and dressed in a police-like uniform and
informed the volunteers managing the coming and going that he came to conduct a
routine control on the island.12 Upon reaching the island, he began a two-hour massacre.
In the two attacks, he killed 77 people.
The terrorist harbored a strong hatred against immigrants in general and Muslims
more specifically. He argued for an expulsion of all Muslims from Europe and encouraged
a civil war between the “native” Europeans and the “invading” Muslims. He believed in
the “Eurabia” conspiracy theory, which suggests that liberal European elites and Muslim
immigrants together are trying to create an Islamic Europe. According to this theory, even
Muslims who do not support any kind of extreme Islam are just “posing” as progressives
and are both “camouflaged and . . . dangerous.”13 His distrust in immigrants and specifi-
cally Muslims was accordingly a central motivation for the attacks, and this was both
propagated by the terrorist himself in his manifesto and highlighted in the media after the
attacks.14
In July 2011, the campaigns for the municipal elections in September had not yet
begun in earnest. The Labor Party (AP) led a majority coalition government together
with the Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Center Party (SP). This was the first time the
Labor Party had been in a coalition government, but the party had dominated
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Norwegian politics through its majority and later minority governments since the
Second World War. The Norwegian response to the July 22 attacks, which was a
solemn celebration of Norwegian values and lacked belligerent language, was different
from recent responses to terrorist attacks. In the years after 9/11, the responses to
(mostly Islamic) terrorism followed the “War on Terror” framing.15 However, the in-
group background and political ideology of the terrorist probably made this framing
less relevant after the Norwegian attacks (although the first speech by the Prime
Minister somewhat followed this framing).16 In the days after the attacks, a private
initiative led to the organization of “Rose Marches” in almost a hundred municipalities
across the country, where close to one-third of the Norwegian adult population
participated.17 The Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg became the central exponent of
the Norwegian interpretation of the attacks and he argued in his speech at the march in
Oslo that the response should be “more democracy, more openness and more human-
ity” and “democracy, togetherness and tolerance.”18 In the aftermath of the attacks the
Progress Party came under scrutiny and was criticized, both because of the terrorist’s
former membership in the party and because of the party’s central role in the debate on
immigration.19 While the party leadership denied any responsibility for the terrorist
and his actions, both the party leader and certain local leaders were led to reflect
publicly on their role in the immigration debate after the attacks.20
Explaining the Norwegian response
Terrorism often leads to backlashes in democratic publics and there are multiple
examples of attacks leading to the loss of public support for terrorist organizations.21
Crenshaw argues that while terrorists may have at least tacit support from certain
groups, they may lose this support if they overstep these groups’ “tolerance limit” for
violence.22 After a few especially egregious attacks, this loss of support has contributed
to the decline of the terrorist groups themselves.23 The Norwegian response mirrored
these backlashes with a strong rejection of the terrorist attacks and the terrorist by the
public. The change in out-group trust, which could be interpreted as a reaction to the
terrorist’s ideology, is however puzzling. The only paper studying the consequences of
terrorism for support for the ideology of the terrorists find no effect, neither positive
nor negative, of terrorism,24 and even in cases where terrorist groups cease their
operations after backlashes, the political struggle often continues through other (non-
violent) means and maintains its public support.25 There does, accordingly, not seem to
be a direct connection between public backlashes against terrorism and the rejection of
the terrorist cause.
This paper studies two possible explanations for the increase in out-group trust.26
On the one hand, the increase in trust could be caused by the so-called “black sheep
effect,” a negative reaction towards the terrorist and as a consequence his attitudes.
Aarstad, Jakobsson, and Blom27 argue that because of the black sheep effect, people felt
cognitive dissonance after the attacks and that this led to a dissociation from the
terrorist’s attitudes. On the other hand, the increase could be a consequence of
characteristics of the backlash. Rather than being a direct effect of the attacks, the
public response and the emphasis on tolerance after the attacks could have led people
to increase their out-group trust.
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The black sheep effect and cognitive dissonance
Both Aarstad and Jakobsson and Blom find more positive attitudes towards immigrants
(and implicit attitudes towards Barack Obama’s middle name, Hussein) after the attacks
and interpret this as caused by dissociation from the terrorist’s ideology.28 According to
Jakobsson and Blom,29 hostility toward the terrorist may have caused cognitive
dissonance,30 leading people to dissociate from the terrorist and his ideas. They point to
“the black sheep effect,” which refers to how people view misconduct by a group member
more negatively than misconduct by others because it threatens the group image.31 People
accordingly tried “to dissociate themselves from the terrorist and his ideas.”32 There is
reason to believe that the black sheep effect would affect some groups more than others.
Eidelman and Biernat find that the black sheep effect is not only based on defense of the
group image but also on a wish to keep one’s self-image intact.33 While the preservation of
the group image could affect every member of the group, the need to preserve one’s self-
image varies from person to person depending on the level of similarity with the
misbehaving group member. The need to dissociate from the perpetrator could accord-
ingly be stronger for people who felt more similar to the terrorist.
Two characteristics are especially relevant for the evaluations of similarity in this
case, attitudes towards immigration and support for the Progress Party. The terrorist
was extremely critical of Norwegian immigration policy, possibly leading people who
were negative towards immigration to experience more dissonance. One could thus
expect an inverse relationship between prior attitudes towards immigration and change
in out-group trust. Second, as the terrorist had been a member of the Progress Party,
people affiliated with this party could have experienced more dissonance than others. In
the period after the attacks, Norwegian media both highlighted the terrorist’s connec-
tion with the party and the coverage of the party was more critical than before.34 Thus,
supporters of the Progress Party could have felt more cognitive dissonance and devel-
oped more positive attitudes towards out-groups than others did. Finally, people who
had positive views of immigrants before the attacks probably did not experience
cognitive dissonance, as their attitudes were not “similar” to those of the terrorist.
This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: People who felt cognitive dissonance after the attacks increased their
out-group trust more than others did.
The public backlash
While the attacks themselves may have caused the increase in trust, it is also possible that
specifics of the backlash after the attacks led to higher trust. Similar to after other terrorist
attacks, the backlash against the attacks in Norway consisted of a rally around the political
leadership, media coverage concerned with rebuilding the national community, and public
commemorations across the country.35 This massive mobilization of Norwegian society
may in itself have created a stronger feeling of community and togetherness that in turn
increased trust. However, democratic values in general, and tolerance more specifically,
were central in the different manifestations of the backlash and this may have influenced
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people’s attitudes. Finally, the political characteristics of the backlash may have led to
experiences of exclusion and censorship by groups that did not agree.
Events such as the terrorist attacks may in themselves lead to increases in trust.36
Experiencing what Uslaner calls “galvanizing national crises” creates the feeling of being
“in the same boat” and increases the feeling of similarity between members of the stricken
communities.37 Feelings of similarity, in turn, increases trust. After the attacks in Norway,
out-groups such as immigrants were explicitly included in the community, and some of
the victims did have immigrant backgrounds. People may thus have felt more similar to
out-groups and increased their trust after the attacks.
It is also possible that the specific political characteristics of the backlash influenced
trust. Crucially, democratic values were central in the response by the political elite, in the
media, and in the public commemorations,38 and this may have affected out-group trust.
Especially the emphasis on tolerance may have affected people’s views of out-groups.
While most Norwegians took part in the commemorations after the attacks one way or
another, not everyone may have experienced the backlash in the same way.39 Contrary to
the emphasis on “openness,” those who had divergent views from the ones expressed in
the political debate may have felt less able to participate after the attacks.40 There is reason
to believe that these groups may have reacted to the pressure and not increased their out-
group trust as much as others did.
Hypothesis 2: How people perceived the public backlash against the attacks influ-
enced their out-group trust.
Data and methodology
The analysis is based on panel data from the project “Social Media and the New Public
Sphere—Consequences for Democracy and Citizenship.” Panel data from before and after
the attacks are used to study different types of attitudinal change. The first round was
conducted before the attacks in March and April 2011, and the second round was
conducted four weeks after the attacks in August of the same year. The respondents
were drawn from Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) Gallup’s web panel, which comprised of
62,000 individuals. Each round consists of two parts: one cross-sectional survey which is
designed to be representative of the 93 percent of Norwegians who have access to the
Internet and a second part, which is a panel consisting of social media users (who use
Facebook twice or more per week and/or Twitter once or more per week). The study is
based on the panel component of the survey, using the first and second round with a total
of 2252 respondents. There were 4183 respondents in the first round, and the response
rate of the respondents who were contacted again was 66 percent.
The panel is representative of Norwegian social media users, and design weights are
used. To determine the differences between the panel and the broader population, the two
samples are compared through student’s T-tests. Comparing the rounds of the social
media panel with the cross-sectional sample conducted at the same time shows a few
differences. The social media sample is younger, has higher education, is more negative
towards immigration,and perceived a larger personal threat than others after the attacks.
On the questions concerning the attacks they experienced a bit more togetherness,
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participated to a higher extent in the Rose Marches, and felt more able to voice their
opinion, but did not differ significantly on the other variables. The differences are
relatively small.41 The possible problem of representativeness is in addition reduced, as
the main interest here is the change in trust rather than the absolute levels. The panelists
only need to respond similarly as the rest of the public to the attacks for the results to be
valid for the broader population. The absolute levels do not need to be the same for the
change to reflect a general trend.
Variables
A conditional change model is used in which the dependent variable is change in trust
(i.e., TRUSTT2-TRUSTT1), and the dependent variable at T1 is included to reduce the
problem of regression to the mean.42 Ordinary least square regression (OLS) is used to
ensure comparability across different models.43 Because the terrorist attacks probably
influenced both the dependent variable (out-group trust) and the independent variables,
the independent variables that do not concern the response to the attacks are used at the
first time-point.
For the measure of out-group trust, two items are used from the question, “How much
do you trust different social groups?”: “People of a different religion” and “People of a
different nationality.” These were used together with “People you meet for the first time”
as measures of out-group trust in Delhey, Newton, and Welzel’s study of the trust radius.44
As the terrorist was very critical of Muslims specifically, the questions about a different
religion and nationality are the most relevant. Still, the respondents determine who they
conceive as the object of the question. The questions are presented on a four-point scale
from “Do not trust at all” to “Trust completely.” The two variables are combined in an
additive index and rescaled to go from 0 to 1.
The question of party identification is used for support of the Progress Party, with
1 denoting people who consider themselves a “Progress Party-man/woman.” Attitudes
towards immigration are taken from two different items. One is at a ten-point scale,
which ranges going from “We should make it easier for immigrants to get access to
Norway” to “We should have much stronger restrictions on the number of immi-
grants.” The other is a five-point scale, which ranges from “agree completely” to
“disagree completely” to the statement “We have enough immigrants and asylum
seekers in this country.” This first scale is inversed so that a high value indicates
support for immigration, and the two scales are combined in an index through
principal component analysis (Crohnbach’s alpha of 0.68). High degrees of institu-
tional trust were the primary cause of the lack of fear after the attacks.45 To measure
institutional trust, trust in the police, the courts, the municipal council, and the
public administration are combined in an index. As trust in the government is closely
related to partisanship, it is excluded. The question is “How much confidence do you
have in the following institutions?,” and the relevant institutions are combined in an
index using PCA (Crohnbach’s alpha of 0.80). Originally, the scale ranged from “Very
much confidence” to “No confidence,” but the scale is inversed so that a high value
indicates trust. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with the
change in out-group trust as institutional trust should lead to lower levels of threat
perception.
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Four items are used to measure the effects of the public response to the attacks. The
first is a question asking if people participated in the “Rose Marches.” The next four
questions tap the respondents’ perceptions of the effects of the attacks. The introduc-
tion was “If you compare Norway today with the situation before the July 22 attacks,
would you say that the society is characterized by more or less”: and the respondents
answered on a five-point scale ranging from “Much less” to “Much more.” To measure
the effects of the possible increased perception of community after the attacks the first
item, “togetherness and community,” is used. To more directly measure the increased
perception of the community with out-groups, the item “antagonisms between ethnic
groups” is used. The final item is used to measure the perceptions of negative effects of
the response to the attacks for the political climate. This is “possibility to voice one’s
opinion” and measures experience of censoring of divergent views. All variables are
recoded to range from 0 to 1.
In his attack on the AUF, the terrorist specifically targeted youth. There was a large
increase in turnout in the youngest cohorts of voters in the election seven weeks after the
attacks and in the public debate after the attacks, and there has been talk of an “Utøya-
generation.”46 Thus, age is included in the analysis and is divided into four groups: below
30 years old, 30 to 44 years old, 45 to 59, and 60 and up. The 45 to 59 group is the
reference group. On the one hand, one could expect that the youth were more fearful and
thus had less trust of out-groups after the attacks. On the other, if the general influence of
the attacks is an increase in trust and the youth were the most influenced by the attacks,
the youth could have increased their trust more than others. The question of political
interest is included as a control. This has four values ranging from “Very interested in
politics” to “Not at all interested in politics.” It is recoded to go from 0 to 1, where 1
denotes “Very interested in politics.” Gender and education are included as control
variables. Education is dichotomized into 0, which denotes no higher education, and 1,
which denotes higher education.
As studies of Islamic terrorism show, perceptions of threat may lead to out-group
derogation.47 The relevance of these studies for domestic right-wing extremist terrorist
attacks is not clear, but it is possible that results in this analysis could reflect how
groups differ in their perceptions of terrorist threat. Because the Progress Party takes a
strong stance on crime, one possibility is that voters of the Progress Party are more
afraid of crime in general and in this case perceive a higher threat from terrorism.
Differences in threat perception could in turn create differences in out-group trust.
Similarly, Wollebæk et al. show that confidence in the government’s anti-terrorism
capabilities had a prophylactic effect on fear after the attacks.48 To test for differences
in levels of perceptions of threat and confidence in terrorism prevention, three items
are included in the last model: “How worried are you that there will be new terrorist
attacks in Norway in the near future?”; “How much confidence do you have that the
government will prevent new, large scale terrorist attacks in Norway?”; and “To what
extent are you worried that future terrorist attacks will harm you, your family or your
friends?” This is a strong test of the validity of the results as these questions were asked
in the second survey round together with the out-group trust questions. Accordingly, if
political differences in change in trust are still present after controlling for fear and
confidence levels, this strengthens the finding of a different mechanism than threat
perception.
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Results
The results are presented in the following section beginning with the descriptive statistics.
Next, the different models are presented and the results from the six regression analyses are
presented and discussed. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that there is an increase
in out-group trust from the first to the second round of the survey at 0.04.49 In the dataset,
around 10 percent identify with the Progress Party. The views on immigration are relatively
negative, with a mean of .39, or between 4 and 5 on the scale from 1 to 10. The institutional
trust is high, at .63, or above 3 on the scale from 1 to 5. Concerning age, the largest group is
the group between 45 and 59. The panelists are relatively interested in politics, and the
perceptions of threat are comparatively low.50 Confidence in the prevention of terrorism is,
on the other hand, relatively high.
Table 2 reports the results from the regression analyses and change in out-group trust is
the dependent variable. The first model has only an intercept and the second includes the
lagged dependent variable. In the third model, control variables and the variables denoting
partisanship and attitudes towards immigration are included before the interaction term is
included in the fourth model. The fifth model includes the measures of attitudes towards
the effects of the attacks, before the perceptions of threat and confidence variables are
included in the sixth and final model.
Similar to the descriptive statistics, the first intercept-only model shows a mean change of
0.04. Including the lagged dependent variable in the second model shows that the change in
trust after the attacks is negatively correlated with trust before the attacks. There is accord-
ingly a certain regression to the mean where the most trusting people change in a less
positive direction than others. The correlation between the time periods is .58 (i.e. 1-.42),
and the intercept continues to be significant. The third model includes the independent
variables of interest except the interaction and the measures of attitudes towards the effects
of the attacks. Beginning with age and gender, the younger respondents report less positive
change in trust compared with people above 45 years of age. Similarly, male respondents
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the panel.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Out-group trust (T1) 1,987 0.47 0.22 0.00 1.00
Out-group trust (T2) 2,136 0.51 0.21 0.00 1.00
Progress party identification 2,284 0.10 0.30 0 1
Attitudes towards immigration 2,274 0.002 1.02 −1.49 2.32
Institutional trust 2,279 −0.02 1.01 −3.66 2.11
Age (below 30) 2,285 0.18 0.38 0 1
Age (30–44) 2,285 0.28 0.45 0 1
Age (45–59) 2,285 0.39 0.49 0 1
Age (60+) 2,285 0.24 0.43 0 1
Higher education 2,282 0.58 0.49 0 1
Male 2,285 0.48 0.50 0 1
Political interest 2,277 0.58 0.23 0.00 1.00
Rose marches (T2) 2,285 0.34 0.48 0 1
More ethnic antagonism (T2) 2,284 0.38 0.18 0.00 1.00
More togetherness (T2) 2,278 0.75 0.17 0.00 1.00
Less able to voice opinion (T2) 2,282 0.52 0.21 0.00 1.00
National threat (T2) 2,285 0.36 0.22 0.00 1.00
Confidence in terrorism prevention (T2) 2,281 0.58 0.23 0.00 1.00
Personal threat (T2) 2,284 0.35 0.22 0.00 1.00
Attitudes towards immigration (additive index) 2,274 0.39 0.27 0.00 1.00
Institutional trust (additive index) 2,265 0.63 0.17 0.00 1.00
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have a less positive change in trust than women after the attacks, but the higher education
estimate is not significant. People with higher levels of institutional trust (in municipalities,
courts, police, and the public sector in general) increased their trust more than others did
after the attacks. The estimate for political interest is not significant.
Partisanship influences the change in trust after the attacks. People identifying with the
Progress Party do not have higher out-group trust after the attacks than others. Rather, the
estimate indicates that people not identifying with the Progress Party increased their trust
more than Progress Party supporters, all else equal, and this is significant at the .05 level.
Similarly, attitudes towards immigration are positively associated with change in trust
after the attacks. People who were more positive towards immigration before the attacks
Table 2. Determinants of change in out-group trust.
Change in out-group trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.037** 0.230** 0.331** 0.331** 0.395** 0.391**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
Lagged out-group trust −0.416** −0.556** −0.557** −0.563** −0.565**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Age (below 30) −0.067** −0.067** −0.068** −0.074**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age (from 30 to 45) −0.040** −0.041** −0.037** −0.039**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age (above 60) 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Male −0.028** −0.027** −0.025** −0.026**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Higher education 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Progress Party identification −0.033* −0.070** −0.063** −0.055**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Attitude towards immigration 0.037** 0.039** 0.035** 0.033**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Institutional trust 0.017** 0.017** 0.015** 0.010*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Political interest −0.002 −0.005 −0.002 0.0004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Rose marches 0.010 0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
More ethnic antagonism −0.079** −0.068**
(0.022) (0.022)
More togetherness −0.040. −0.040.
(0.023) (0.024)








Interaction: attitude towards immigration and
identification with the Progress party
−0.039* −0.039* −0.037*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
N 1,935 1,935 1,886 1,886 1,878 1,873
R2 0.000 0.228 0.319 0.321 0.331 0.338
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.228 0.315 0.317 0.326 0.332
.p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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changed their views on the trustworthiness of out-groups in a more positive direction than
others.
To explore the relationship between Progress Party identification and views on immi-
gration, the fourth model includes an interaction between the two variables. This has little
impact on the estimates except for Progress Party identification. Identifying with the
Progress Party is now highly significant (.01) and more negative. The interaction term is
negative, about the same size as the estimate for attitudes towards immigration, and
significant at the .05 level. Because it is the same size as the estimate for attitudes towards
immigration, the two cancel each other out for people identifying with the Progress Party.
The change in trust after the attacks for the people identifying with the Progress Party was
not dependent on their views on immigration before the attacks. Plotting the predicted
change in out-group trust based on party identification and attitudes towards immigration
in Figure 1 clearly shows the difference between the groups. Here, the x-axis denotes the
attitude towards immigration before the attacks, and the y-axis denotes the change in trust
after the attacks. The two different lines indicate the values for the people identifying or
not identifying with the Progress Party, and the gray area indicates the 95 percent
confidence intervals. While people identifying with the Progress Party are predicted to
have the same level of trust after the attacks for every level of attitude towards immigra-
tion, other people are predicted to have higher levels of trust the more positive they were
towards immigration.
The fifth model includes the questions on the perceived effects of the attacks and on
participation in the Rose Marches. Responses to these questions are indeed correlated with
changes in out-group trust. While the estimate for participation in the Rose Marches is
not statistically significant, both the estimate for perceptions of ethnic antagonisms and
Figure 1. Predicted change in out-group trust by party affiliation and attitudes towards immigration.
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the possibility to voice one’s opinion are statistically significant (.01). Accordingly, people
who responded that they thought there was less ethnic antagonism after the attacks,
changed their trust more in a positive direction than others, and conversely, people who
experienced that they were less able to voice their opinion after the attacks, changed their
trust in a less positive direction after the attacks. The estimate for togetherness is
unexpectedly negative although it is only significant at the .1 level. Including these
variables reduces the estimates for identifying with the Progress Party and attitudes
towards immigration, but not to a large extent, and both are still significant at .01. It
accordingly does not seem to be the case that these estimates only covered differences in
perceptions of the attacks. Rather, the change in out-group trust seems to be correlated
with both perceptions of the attacks, party identity, and attitudes towards immigration.
Finally, the sixth model includes questions on threat from terrorism for oneself and for
the country and on confidence in prevention of terrorism. Replicating the findings in
other studies, the estimate for national threat and not personal threat is significant,51 and
perception of national threat leads to lower out-group trust after the attacks. The effects of
the terrorist threat have, however, mainly been studied in the context of Islamic terrorism
and it is thus interesting to find an effect of experiencing terrorist threat after a right-wing
extremist attack on change in out-group trust.52 Similarly, the estimate for confidence in
government anti-terrorism measures is positive. The changes in the other estimates are
relatively small. As could be expected when including confidence in anti-terrorism mea-
sures, the estimate for institutional trust decreases. The estimate for identification with the
Progress Party decreases somewhat in level but maintains direction and significance. This
seems to dismiss the possibility that the estimates only mask a difference in threat
perception and institutional trust between people identifying with different parties.
The first hypothesis stated that cognitive dissonance caused by the black sheep effect
created the increase in out-group trust, an explanation proposed by Jakobsson, Blom, and
Aarstad for their findings of more positive attitudes towards immigration after the
attacks.53 While some people may have increased their trust in out-groups as a conse-
quence of cognitive dissonance, this mechanism does not explain the general increase in
out-group trust in Norwegian society. People who were negative towards immigration or
who identified with the Progress Party increased their trust less than others after the
attacks. Thus, the general increase in out-group trust was not caused by these groups
experiencing cognitive dissonance.
The fact that Progress Party identification moderates the positive relationship between
views on immigration and trust could have indicated that cognitive dissonance only
influenced people who were both identifying with the party and negative towards immi-
gration. However, the interaction estimate is not large enough to make people identifying
with the Progress Party more trusting than others, even for the people who were most
negative towards immigration. Rather, party affiliation cancels out the effect of prior
attitudes towards immigration, and prior attitudes thus did not affect the trust of people
identifying with the Progress Party.
There is also support for parts of the second hypothesis. People who experienced the
aftermath of the attacks as less characterized by ethnic antagonisms than before the attacks
increased their trust more than others, and people who felt less able to voice their opinion
after the attacks became less trusting compared to others. However, the estimate for
togetherness and community was not in the expected direction (albeit only significant at
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the .1 level). The increase in out-group trust was accordingly not caused by people feeling
increased levels of togetherness and community in general. Out-group trust seems to have
been affected by perceptions directly connected to out-groups and by experiences of
censorship, but not by the general increase in perception of togetherness created by the
attacks.
Discussion
The general increase in out-group trust was not caused by cognitive dissonance in people
who were negative towards immigration or who were identifying with the Progress Party.
While these groups also increased their trust in out-groups, they did so to a lower extent
than others. The results show an effect of prior attitudes that is the opposite of the one
hypothesized. It was people who were already positive towards immigration or who did
not identify with the Progress Party who increased their trust more than others. Parts of
the second hypothesis do however receive support in the analyses. There are no (or
possibly negative) effect of perceptions of increased togetherness and no effect of partici-
pating in the Rose Marches in itself. Perceiving lower levels of ethnic antagonism after the
attacks were related to higher increases in trust, and feelings of being less able to express
one’s opinions were negatively related to out-group trust. The increase in trust after the
attacks depended on both perceptions of the political effects of the attacks and prior
attitudes, albeit in the opposite way of the first hypothesis.
It is useful to revisit the cognitive dissonance hypothesis to understand why it is not
supported by the data. The first condition for the hypothesis is that people must see the
attacks as “misconduct” by the in-group member, and the second is that people resolve the
ensuing cognitive dissonance by changing attitudes towards out-groups. It is highly likely
that the public viewed the attacks as “misconduct” or that the attacks overstepped the
“tolerance limit.”54 The murdering of innocent children one by one was extremely ruthless
and even violent right-wing extremists distanced themselves from the ruthlessness of the
attacks.55 Norwegian society also had little experience with terrorism, and although there
had been other examples of extreme right-wing violence, there is no reason to believe that
either Progress Party supporters or people with negative attitudes towards immigration
should have been more supportive of terrorism.
How the possible cognitive dissonance was resolved is not as straightforward. For
cognitive dissonance to cause attitude change, the connection between the attacks and
the attitudes must be strong. After lone-wolf attacks by in-group members, debates on the
mental health of the terrorists are not uncommon, and this was also the case in Norway.56
Viewing the terrorist as a lunatic and the attacks as results of his insanity would break the
connection between the attacks and the ideology as it is the madness rather than the
ideology that caused the attacks. Together with the lack of findings from earlier research,
there is little reason to expect an effect of cognitive dissonance in general after terrorist
attacks.
Rather than an effect of cognitive dissonance, the increase in trust seems to have been a
reaction to the political characteristics of both the attacks and the backlash. People
experiencing less ethnic antagonism after the attacks increased their trust more than
others did. It could seem counterintuitive that terrorist attacks motivated by hatred against
different ethnic groups were perceived as causing less ethnic antagonism in Norwegian
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society. One could have interpreted this as a consequence of the increased feeling of
togetherness after the attacks, but the analyses show that this was not related to out-group
trust. Rather, this should be interpreted as a reaction towards the ideas of the terrorist and
a response to the core political message of the backlash. This indicates that the increase in
out-group trust was indeed based on political considerations concerning the nature of the
attacks and not only on the experience of being together during a crisis. The increase in
trust seems to be directly connected to the political characteristics of the attacks and the
backlash.
The increase in out-group trust was in addition dependent on prior political beliefs,
and this holds when controlling for experiences of the effects of the attacks. The finding of
an opposite effect of prior attitudes and party affiliation than hypothesized shows that
politically motivated reasoning affected people’s response to the attacks and the backlash.
People are generally prone to accept information that confirms their prior attitudes
(confirmation bias) and to disregard counter-attitudinal information (disconfirmation
bias),57 and this seems to be the case here. Those who were positive towards immigration
increased their out-group trust more than others did after the attacks, and the attacks
accordingly affected those who were already positive the most.58 The effect of experiences
of the debate climate after the attacks points in the same direction. People who felt that
they had less opportunity to express their opinions after the attacks increased their trust
less than others did. This shows reactance against the core political message of the
backlash and probably against the experience of loss of freedom that the newfound
consensus created.59 This experience was inherently political, as only people with diver-
gent opinions would feel unable to express them publicly. Thus, those who were already
tolerant would probably not experience this type of self-censorship. The lower increases in
trust by this group thus confirms the finding above that the attacks and the backlash
affected people who were already the most tolerant.
Progress Party supporters exhibit a stronger disconfirmation bias than other groups,
one that is not dependent on their prior attitudes towards immigration. As the terrorist
had not been a member of the Progress Party for a number of years, the connection
between the attacks and the party was relatively weak. It is thus probable that this bias was
caused by more than solely by the attacks. At the very minimum, it seems to show that
Progress Party supporters interpreted the media attention to the terrorist’s former party
membership as partisan.60 However, the combination of the central position of Labor
Party politicians, a perception of Norwegian media as left-leaning, and the direct and
indirect attacks on the Progress Party may have led Progress Party supporters to interpret
the core message of the backlash as partisan as well.61 For Progress Party supporters, the
political message of the backlash thus seems to have been disregarded.
In sum, this shows that the specifics of both the attacks and the backlash affected
attitudes. As earlier studies of the consequences of terrorism often have focused on the
psychological effects and especially the increases in perceptions of threat after attacks,62
few have studied the political aspects of attacks and their backlashes. The results here show
these characteristics are central to the effects of terrorism, at least of domestic terrorism.
Some caveats are however necessary. On the one hand it is not clear to what extent the
content of backlash is given by the characteristics of the attacks themselves. On the other
hand, the effects of the backlash seem to be circumscribed by other contextual factors. In
this case, even though the Prime Minister did not emphasize the former party affiliation of
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the terrorist or the current one of the victims,63 party affiliation had important conse-
quences for the attitudinal effects of the attacks. Similarly, politically motivated reasoning
led to differences in the reactions of people with different prior attitudes. The effects of
both terrorist attacks and their backlashes thus seem to be dependent on the political
context.
Studying the Norwegian public offers insights into a group not often studied after
terrorist attacks. As most recent studies are of Islamic terrorism in non-Islamic countries,
the terrorist ideology is seldom directly relevant for the political attitudes of the public
(i.e., the majority population). In Norwegian society, the ideology of the terrorist was
connected both to a central political cleavage, immigration policy, and to a mainstream
political party, the Progress Party. Indeed, the group delineated by attitudes towards
immigration and by Progress Party affiliation could be regarded as an operationalization
of the terrorist’s imagined constituency.64 The findings here do not support an expectation
that terrorism leads this constituency to moderate their views, not even when terrorists
cross the “tolerance limit.”65 Rather, they show that the constituency is more resistant to
change than other groups in society. Other groups, however, may change as a consequence
of attacks and the following backlash, and especially groups that were the most negative
towards the terrorist ideology from the start. The political views of terrorists may thus
become even more marginalized than before and political polarization may increase. As
Abrahms argues, people often infer extremist ideology from the use of terrorism.66
Terrorist attacks may accordingly increase the gap between the constituency and the
rest of society,67 and make a non-violent, democratic political campaign more difficult.68
While terrorists may try to provoke an overreaction by the security forces,69 they may as
easily succeed in creating an overreaction by society in general.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional sample.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Out-group trust (T1) 968 0.47 0.21 0.00 1.00
Out-group trust (T2) 798 0.51 0.21 0.00 1.00
Progress party identification 1,124 0.11 0.31 0 1
Progress party vote 962 0.14 0.35 0 1
Age (below 30) 1,127 0.16 0.37 0 1
Age (30–44) 1,127 0.24 0.43 0 1
Age (45–59) 1,127 0.35 0.48 0 1
Age (60+) 1,127 0.34 0.47 0 1
Higher education 1,126 0.53 0.50 0 1
Male 1,127 0.50 0.50 0 1
Political interest 1,123 0.58 0.24 0.00 1.00
Rose marches (T2) 858 0.28 0.45 0 1
More ethnic antagonism (T2) 854 0.38 0.19 0.00 1.00
More togetherness (T2) 856 0.74 0.18 0.00 1.00
Less able to voice opinion (T2) 855 0.54 0.21 0.00 1.00
National threat (T2) 858 0.35 0.23 0.00 1.00
Confidence in terrorism prevention (T2) 857 0.59 0.24 0.00 1.00
Personal threat (T2) 858 0.33 0.22 0.00 1.00
Attitudes towards immigration (additive index) 1,071 0.42 0.26 0.00 1.00
Institutional trust (additive index) 1,115 0.63 0.18 0.00 1.00
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Chapter 3
Are we all Charlie?
The international and domestic
effects of terrorist attacks
75
Abstract
Terrorist attacks reduce general support for immigration and this has been
attributed to heightened perceptions of threat after terrorist attacks. Such
attacks however, also generate specific responses by politicians, the media
and the public itself, and the effects of a terrorist attack may be conditioned
by these responses. The French response to the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper
Cacher attacks in January 2015 emphasised republican values and seemed
more tolerant than prior societal responses to Islamic terrorism.
This paper uses the European Social Survey to compare the effects in
France of the attacks with the effects in six other European countries, using
a regression-discontinuity design. While the attacks reduced the non-French
respondents’ support for immigration, there was no such effect in France.
This is interpreted as an effect of the French political mobilisation and debate,
and as support for a separate effect of the political framing of terrorist attacks.
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Introduction
‘Today it is the Republic as a whole that has been attacked. The
Republic equals freedom of expression; the Republic equals culture,
creation; it equals pluralism and democracy.’ (President François Hol-
lande 2015)
Terrorists have collaborated with each other and spread their propaganda across
borders since the first Russian anarchists in the 19th century (Rapoport 2004).
While early terrorists sought international recognition, their actions were usually
limited to one national context or to attacks on national targets in other countries.
Following the trend of globalisation, both the goals and means of terrorists have
been globalised, and the current wave of Islamic terrorism threatens a global pub-
lic. The 9/11 attacks spurred a broad range of research on attitudinal consequences
of terrorism (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos et al. 2002; Huddy, Feldman and Weber
2007; Traugott et al. 2002), and a central finding is that attitudes towards out-
groups become more negative after terrorist attacks (Boomgaarden and de Vreese
2007; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos
et al. 2002; Huddy, Feldman, Taber et al. 2005; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).
Indeed, terrorist attacks have been found to affect attitudes in countries far from the
actual attacks (Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2011; Finseraas and Listhaug
2013; Legewie 2013). However, the existing research has not studied if the ef-
fects of terrorism are dependent on the framings of, and the societal responses to,
attacks.1 This paper uses the seventh round of the European Social Survey (ESS
2014) to study the effects of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks in Paris
in January 2015 on attitudes towards immigration policy. This paper asks if the
effects in France were different from the effects in the other countries as could be
expected if the effects of terrorism are conditioned by the political framing after
an attack.
The effects of terrorist attacks on political attitudes may be dependent on so-
cietal responses to the terrorist attacks. While the ‘War on Terror’-framing dom-
inated the responses to terrorism both in the US and internationally in the period
after 9/11 (Norris, Kern and Just 2003), both responses and framings may vary
between attacks and between different countries after the same attacks. This may
lead to different effects domestically and internationally. The French political re-
sponse to the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks is one such example. While
1 This research is characterised by an (implicit and explicit) expectation of similar effects of
terrorism across different national contexts (see, for example, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, p. 2).
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support for freedom of expression dominated the response across Europe (Gómez-
Domínguez et al. 2017), French ‘republican values’ also became a central rallying
point for the French public (Cohu, Maisonneuve and Testé 2016). These values
were emphasised both by the political elite, as the introductory quote exemplifies,
and in the broader mobilisation of the French public in response to the attacks. If
the effects of terrorist attacks are dependent on the societal response, one could
thus expect the effects in France to differ from the effects in other countries.
Terrorism and attitudes towards immigration
People become more negative towards out-groups and think in terms of stereo-
types after terrorist attacks and when perceiving terrorism as a threat (Echebarria-
Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos et al. 2002; Huddy,
Feldman and Weber 2007; Traugott et al. 2002). Terrorist attacks also make
people more negative towards immigrants in general (Legewie 2013; Schüller
2016) and increase support for restrictions on immigration (Finseraas, Jakobsson
and Kotsadam 2011; Noelle-Neumann 2002). This has been explained by people’s
heightened perceptions of threat from immigrants, and the literature on attitudes to-
wards immigration has found that perceptions of sociotropic threats to the economy
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), to culture (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner
2016) and to security, reduce support for immigration.2 Canetti-Nisim, Ariely and
Halperin (2008) argue that there is a hierarchy of threats, with the security threat
being the most important, and terrorism has been found to increase the perception
of threat to both culture and security (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Branton
et al. 2011; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013).
The literature does not reveal a clear-cut relationship between changes in threat
perceptions after terrorism and attitudes towards immigration policy. In the US,
Huddy, Feldman, Taber et al. (2005) found that perceptions of threat from terror-
ism are related to supporting restrictions on immigration. Similarly, Lahav and
Courtemanche (2012) found in a survey experiment that exposing respondents
to a news story highlighting that terrorists may hide among immigrants affected
respondents’ support for immigration policies. Findings from studies of the ef-
fects of actual attacks are more ambiguous. Although Merolla and Zechmeister
2 Individual-level (egotropic) concern over immigration has received little support as a determ-
inant of immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Malhotra, Margalit and Mo (2013)
argue that this is caused by the low prevalence of this threat in society, while Finseraas, Røed and
Schøne (2017) argue that these concerns have a polarising effect.
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(2009) found a correlation between perception of threat and support for border con-
trol, they did not find that threat perception explained changes in support between
panel rounds before and after the 9/11 attacks in the US. Similarly, Finseraas
and Listhaug (2013) found that perceptions of threat from terrorism in Europe
increased after the Mumbai attacks in 2008, but the researchers did not find corres-
ponding changes in attitudes towards immigration policy. While threat perceptions
determine attitudes towards immigration policy in general, there does not seem
to be a direct relationship between terrorist attacks (and terrorist threat) and atti-
tudes towards immigration policy. Rather, the effects of terrorist attacks may be
conditioned by other factors.
The differences in the findings cited above could be explained by differences in
the framings of policies and attacks. The threat of terrorism may increase anxiety
in the public, and an anxious population seek security and prefer policies and politi-
cians who can provide such security. However, this does not mean that anxious
individuals will support any type of policies. Rather, the policy support may be
dependent on the framing of the policies as something that creates security (Al-
bertson and Gadarian 2015). The divergent findings above could, accordingly, be
consequences of the differing relevance of immigration policy in the two cases.
While Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) used a text that explicitly mentioned the
possible immigration of terrorists, Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) studied the ef-
fects in Europe of the Mumbai terrorist attacks —attacks that were of little relev-
ance for European immigration policy. In sum, the consequences of terrorism for
attitudes towards immigration policy may be more dependent on the framing and
relevance of the attacks than what has been acknowledged so far. This leads to
different expectations for the domestic and international effects of terrorism.
International and domestic effects
The effects of terrorist attacks may be stronger in the country where the attacks take
place. Media attention is more focused on domestic attacks than on international
attacks, and attacks could thus affect the domestic public more than international
publics, such as through higher perceptions of threat (Harcup and O’Neill 2001,
2017; Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007). In addition, domestic attacks may be
perceived as more politically relevant for the domestic public, as these attacks are
directly related to domestic policies. The domestic political debate in the immedi-
ate aftermath of terrorism, however, is often very different from the international
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debate. For example, journalists often change their role during national crises such
as terrorism (Kitch 2003; Schudson 2003; Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou 2018),
and become more concerned with recreating the threatened national community
than with taking a critical stance towards the elites (Zandberg and Neiger 2005).
Moreover, at the domestic elite level, there is often little debate about, and dissent
from, the government’s framing, and there is strong rallying around the political
leadership (Chowanietz 2010; Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Wollebæk, Steen-
Johnsen et al. 2013). Domestic political debates are often muted, and it may take
some time before it is possible to criticise the government’s handling of a crisis
domestically, even when such criticism is levelled internationally. In sum, the
framings available to the domestic audience may be both more homogeneous and
less critical than at the international level. This has important consequences for the
expected effects of terrorism, as the effects of framing are strongest when there are
no competing frames (Chong and Druckman 2010, 2013; Gershkoff and Kushner
2005; Lecheler and de Vreese 2016).
Outside of the political elite, recent attacks have also led to domestic demon-
strations in which the public express their opposition to the terrorists and to the
fear and anxiety that attacks create (Browning 2018; Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen and
Wollebæk 2012). While these demonstrations may be emulated in other countries,
the demonstrations to domestic attacks are usually much larger. These demonstra-
tions may reduce anxiety in the public and could lead to an attenuation of the effect
domestically. Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2007) show that the perception of other
people’s worries affect policy support, and demonstrations may thus even affect
people who do not directly participate (see also Conejero and Etxebarria 2007).
While the domestic political climate may differ from the international climate
after attacks, there is no reason to expect different attitudinal effects unless content
of the framing is different. If the framings at the domestic and international level
are similar and follow the same pattern, the effects may be qualitatively similar
but possibly be stronger at the domestic level than internationally. However, when
the domestic framing diverges from the international, as was the case after Charlie
Hebdo, one could expect differences in the domestic and international reactions.
The attacks and the French response
On January 7, 2015, two brothers entered the offices of the satirical newspaper
Charlie Hebdo. Inside, they killed 12 and injured 11; the fatalities included well-
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known caricaturists at the newspaper. The terrorists escaped from Paris in a car,
and the massive manhunt that followed ended two days later in a siege of the terror-
ists’ hiding place and the storming of a kosher supermarket where an accomplice
of the brothers had taken several hostages. In total, 17 were killed in the two
attacks, including the three attackers, and 22 were injured. Charlie Hebdo was
targeted because it had published caricatures depicting the prophet Muhammad in
several of its editions, and the terrorists believed that this was blasphemous. The
supermarket was part of the Hyper Cacher chain of kosher supermarkets, and was
chosen deliberately to attack Jews.
Already on the first day of the attacks, President Hollande (2015a,c) described
the attacks as attacks on the French ‘Republic’ and spoke of ‘republican values’.
In the following days, he and other members of his cabinet and the political elite
continued to emphasise republican values and spoke of unity and the rejection of
racism and antisemitism (Hollande 2015b). This response by the political elite
was reflected in the broad mobilisation by the French public. On January 11, four
days after the attacks started in Paris, around four million people participated in the
largest public demonstrations in France since the Second World War. The demon-
strators supported the victims and their families, and through ‘Je suis Charlie’ and
similar slogans, the demonstrators showed their support for republican values such
as liberty, equality, and fraternity, freedom of speech, tolerance and the principle
of laïcité (or secularity).
The response to the attacks, both in terms of elite framing and in terms of the
mobilisation of the French public, seems to have been relatively tolerant. Indeed,
Nugier et al. (2016) found, in an experimental setting before and after the attacks,
that reminding French respondents of the republican value of colour-blind equality
reduced the feelings of threat; however, they did not find such an effect when
reminding people of laïcité, a value that was central in the demonstrations. Nugier
et al. (2016) however, explicitly reminded respondents that laïcité was understood
as freedom from other people’s religious expressions, exemplified by the recent
debate on headscarves in French public schools. This is, in fact, a re-interpretation
of the term, which historically had a more tolerant interpretation as freedom of
religion (Idriss 2005). It still seems likely that this liberal interpretation dominated
in the demonstrations, since the people who demonstrated were mostly liberal
and left-wing (Mayer and Tiberj 2016). Cohu, Maisonneuve and Testé (2016)
and Vasilopoulos, Marcus and Foucault (2018) however, did find more standard
reactions to the attacks than did Nugier et al. (2016), with more prejudice and more
authoritarian attitudes. Brouard, Vasilopoulos and Foucault (2018) also found that
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while the attacks led to a conservative shift in the French public, they did not
increase support for restrictions on immigration.
Although the French response was possibly more tolerant than earlier responses
to Islamic terrorism, it is unclear to what extent this translated to relatively tolerant
reactions outside France. Castanho Silva (2018) did not find effects of the attacks
on attitudes in neither France nor in other European countries. Gómez-Domínguez
et al. (2017) found that the domestic and international media similarly emphasised
freedom of speech, but they did not find (or discuss) the presence of republican
values in international media. Thus, the French mobilisation around these values
does not seem to have been broadcast to the same extent, and to the extent that it
was, these values may have had less effect because they were not known outside
France previously. By contrast, the “War on Terror” framing has dominated the
debate on terrorism since 9/11 (Norris, Kern and Just 2003), and it may have
influenced the interpretation of the attacks and the coverage by the international
media. Finally, characteristics of the attacks themselves, and especially the Islamic
motivation for attacking Charlie Hebdo, may have heightened perceptions of a
cultural threat from Muslims.
Method and data
This paper is based on the seventh round of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014).
The survey was conducted in some of the participating countries during the period
around the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher store in Paris
in 2015. This is leveraged as a natural experiment, as exposure to the terrorist news
after the attacks was determined by the timing of the individual survey interviews.3
Accordingly, it is possible to identify the causal effect of exposure to news of the
terrorist attacks as assignment to the two groups (before and after) is random.
This design is similar to a regression-discontinuity design (Angrist and Pischke
2008). Interpreting the results as effects of the terrorist attacks depends on no other
simultaneous events that influence the same attitudes and no systematic differences
between the groups interviewed before and after the attacks. This paper leverages a
second causal identification strategy as well. By comparing the attitudinal changes
in France with those in other European countries, it is possible to distinguish
differences between the effect in France and in other countries.
3 For other examples of this identification strategy, see Castanho Silva (2018), Finseraas,
Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011), Finseraas and Listhaug (2013), Geys and Qari (2017), Jakobsson
and Blom (2014) and Legewie (2013).
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This paper assumes that the timing of the interviews is random: namely, that
there are no systematic differences between the people interviewed on the days
before the attacks and the days after the attacks. The attacks are treated as a
series of local randomised experiments in which the assignment into treatment or
control groups is given by the timing of the interview. Because the assignment
to treatment is considered random, it is possible to use the difference in means
between the people interviewed before and after the attacks to find the causal ef-
fect of the attacks. A central problem with using an as-if-random assumption in
regression-discontinuity designs is that the forcing variable may affect the depend-
ent variable even at small bandwidths around the threshold (de la Cuesta and Imai
2016). In such cases, using a comparison of means may just show the effect of
the forcing variable on the dependent variable and not the effect of the treatment
at the threshold. This problem is less relevant in this case, as there is little reason
to expect the timing of the interview in itself would affect the respondents’ atti-
tudes towards immigration, as it may in other cases where there is a direct (causal)
relationship between the forcing variable and the dependent variable.
A second possible problem is if people can sort around the threshold (Lee and
Lemieux 2010): that is, if people decide whether to be interviewed before or after
the attacks. There is no reason to expect that the attacks affected participation
before they occurred, as the respondents did not know the attacks were coming.
The respondents’ decisions to participate after the attacks could possibly have been
affected by the attacks, but it is unclear how this should be connected to the effect
of the attacks on the dependent variable.
The analyses are run at the highest regional level, where there is more than one
region (i.e. NUTS 1 or NUTS 24 depending on the countries).5 Using regions and
not countries means that the blocks are selected at a level that is closer to where the
interviews (and thus the random selection into treatment) were conducted. While
the interviews were not conducted in one region at the time, most interviewers
only interviewed in one region, and this is a reason to believe that the random
selection of respondents answering before and after the attacks happened at the
regional level. Blocking at the regional level also ensures that the comparison
of means is done towards people from the same part of the country, rather than
4 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a standard for geographical
areas in the European Union.
5 The analyses follow the recommendations by Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik (2015) and
use the code from the rdlocrand R-package Cattaneo, Titiunik and Vasquez-Bare (2016), modified
to allow for blocked sampling and blocked measurement of the means. Replication R-code is
available online.
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being a comparison of treated and untreated groups far away from each other. This
may also remove more of the sampling variability, as the respondents within each
region should be more similar than those within each country (Gerber and Green
2012, pp. 72-73). All respondents answering on the first day of the attacks are
removed from the analysis, as their treatment status is unknown, and similarly, all
the respondents who answer that they are of Islamic faith are excluded, as they may
be affected differently by the attacks (e.g., Jakobsson and Blom 2014; Solheim
2018).
To make sure that the before and after groups can be compared, only regions
that pass balance tests are used.6 While there is little reason to expect system-
atic differences in the groups answering the survey before and after the attacks,
there may be random differences between the two groups. If these differences
are connected to attitudes on immigration, these imbalances may cause incorrect
inferences. The balance tests are run for each of the regions and evaluate to what
extent the groups are indeed balanced around the threshold. The tests are first
run at the smallest possible bandwidth (i.e. the smallest number of days), with
a minimum of 10 respondents on both sides of the attacks, and if the sample is
balanced, the bandwidth is widened by one day and the test is repeated. Only re-
gions with at least 10 respondents on either side of the threshold within the first 31
days are included. Following the recommendations from Cattaneo, Frandsen and
Titiunik (2015)), the widest balanced bandwidth, where all smaller bandwidths are
balanced, is used. As shown in Table 3.1, there are three French regions and 13
others that are balanced, and this amounts to a total of 214 French respondents and
851 respondents from the other six countries.
The countries included in the analyses vary in their baseline levels of support
for immigration. Low baseline support may create a ‘flooring effect’ because
people who are already responding on the negative extreme of the scale (here
‘Allow none’) are unable to move in a negative direction. The absolute difference
in means may not be a good measure in these countries, and this is especially
problematic for the comparison with the effects in France, a country with higher
6 These tests are run for gender, age, national income decile, dummy for parents born in country,
dummy for being in paid work and five education dummy variables. None of these variables could
be affected by the attacks (Montgomery et al. 2018). Recent papers have controlled for ideology
(Castanho Silva 2018) or used ideology (left-right self-placement) as an independent variable
(Brouard, Vasilopoulos and Foucault 2018). This may, however, be problematic here, as placement
on this scale may be affected by the attacks (for example because of increased conservatism under
threat (Nail et al. 2009)), and Castanho Silva (2018, Table 1) does seem to find a right-wing shift.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Region Minimal N N N
Country (NUTS) bandwidth Bandwidth before after total
Austria AT3 21 22 13 40 53
Belgium BE1 29 30 18 19 37
Czech Republic CZ03 4 23 74 126 200
Czech Republic CZ06 6 9 18 29 47
Czech Republic CZ07 5 8 23 20 43
Germany DE1 22 24 15 46 61
Germany DE2 8 8 17 11 28
Germany DEA 16 16 10 66 76
Germany DE3 27 28 12 40 52
Germany DE9 23 24 13 25 38
Germany DEE 29 30 12 23 35
Finland FI1 9 17 18 93 111
The Netherlands NL2 14 27 57 13 70
Total EU 13 regions 29 30 300 551 851
France FR1 19 19 17 29 46
France FR4 22 30 26 23 49
France FR6 19 30 77 42 119
Total France 3 regions 22 30 120 94 214
baseline levels of support for immigration. Two types of estimates are therefore
reported. The first is the absolute difference in means. The second is the relative
difference in means, which is the absolute mean difference divided by the mean
of the untreated group. This measure gives relative change in attitudes, a measure
that takes into account the baseline support and accordingly the maximum possible
amount of change.
The analyses follow the recommendations by Gerber and Green (2012) for
blocked experiments. Blocked experiments are experiments in which the same
experiment is repeated in different settings or contexts (i.e. blocks), and the results
are based on an aggregation of the results in each of these blocked experiments.
The blocks here are the regions; the treatment is the same (i.e. the attacks), and the
probability for being treated varies between regions. To make sure each country
weighs the same in the final analysis, the regional blocks are nested in country
blocks, and the aggregation is done in two steps. The mean difference (and relative
mean difference) is calculated for each region, and then the mean of the mean
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differences is calculated for each country, weighted by the number of respondents
in each region. Finally, the mean of the mean differences in each country is
calculated where each country weights one. This gives a weighted mean difference,
in which each country weighs the same, and each region’s weight in each country
is based on its number of respondents.7
To test the statistic validity of the results, repeated sampling inference is used
(Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik 2015). This sampling is run at the regional level,
and then the same procedure as above is used to calculate the mean difference for
each sample. This sampling is done 1000 times, and the sample mean differences
are then compared to the observed mean difference.8 The significance estimate is
the proportion of sample mean differences that has an absolute value (two-sided
test) that is larger than the observed mean difference. To compare the results
for France with the other countries, the same samples are used to calculate the
difference in sample mean differences, and this is then compared to the difference
in observed mean differences in a one-sided test. All analyses were run in R (R
Core Team 2018).
The dependent variables can be divided into two types of attitudes towards
immigration policy. One is immigration policy in general, and the other is im-
migration policy concerning specific minority groups. The first general index in-
cludes questions on allowing ‘immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe’9,
‘immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority’ and ‘immigrants of different
race/ethnic group from majority’. This index is also divided into two separate
indexes for European (same ethnic group) and non-European (different ethnic
group) immigrants.10 Finally, three items are used as is. These three items ask
about immigration of Muslims, Jews and Roma. All of these survey questions on
immigration had the possible answers ‘Allow many to come and live here’, ‘Allow
some’, ‘Allow a few’ and ‘Allow none’. Both the questions and the indexes are
recoded to go from 0 to 1 so that a positive value indicates support for immigration.
7 Pooling all respondents (no weights) and weighting by region so that each region weights the
same inside the countries does not give very different results. See Tables 3.6 to 3.8 in the appendix.
8 The date of the attacks, ‘1715’, is set as seed to facilitate replication of the results.
9 The similarly phrased question on allowing immigrants from poorer countries inside Europe
was not asked in the Czech Republic and therefore not included.
10 The indexes have a high degree of internal consistency, with a Crohnbach’s alpha of 0.88 for
the general index, 0.86 for the non-European index, and 0.76 for the European index.
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Table 3.2: Effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in six European coun-
tries
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.054 -0.064 -0.050 -0.073 -0.072 -0.032
P-value 0.030 0.036 0.080 0.018 0.011 0.320
N 836 553 837 833 831 832
Regions 13 10 13 13 13 13
Countries 6 5 6 6 6 6
Iterations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Results
The results from the analyses of the mean differences in the countries outside
France are shown in Table 3.2. The results show a clear effect of the attacks on
attitudes towards immigration. Beginning with the effects on the general immig-
ration policy index (leftmost column), the attacks caused a negative reaction, and
this is statistically significant at the .05 level. The effect is at around -0.05 on a
scale from 0 to 1. To check if the results are dependent on the types of immigration
and groups that are considered, the second and third column display the results
from analyses of attitudes towards EU and non-EU immigration. The attacks led
to less support for immigration of both groups outside France, and both effects
are significant (at the .05 and .1 level). The last three columns in the tables show
the effects on attitudes towards immigration of more specific ethnic and religious
groups. These tables do not show the expected pattern. While there is a negative
effect on support for Muslim immigration, there is also a negative effect on support
for Jewish immigration. For attitudes towards immigration of Roma, there are no
effects of the attacks.
In regard to the effects in France in Table 3.3, the estimated difference is
negative for all groups expect for Jewish immigration. None of the results, however,
are statistically significant, and the effects are smaller than the ones for the other
countries and consistently at around -0.03. For Jewish immigration, the estimate
is close to zero, and the P-value of 0.94 shows that 94 % of the random sample
was larger in size than the estimated effect. The last row of the table displays
one-sided significance tests for the effect to be significantly more negative outside
France. This test shows that it is only the estimate for Jewish immigration that is
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Table 3.3: Effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in France
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.032 -0.044 -0.027 -0.031 0.003 -0.039
P-value 0.310 0.180 0.460 0.450 0.940 0.410
N 205 205 206 204 203 204
Regions 3 3 3 3 3 3
Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iterations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
P-value (diff) 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.19 0.04 0.53
significantly less negative in France than in the other countries.11 Thus, the results
so far indicate that there was a negative effect of the attacks outside France on
attitudes towards different types of immigration, but this effect was not present in
France.
Table 3.4: Relative effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in six
European countries
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.094 -0.100 -0.092 -0.190 -0.110 -0.100
P-value 0.055 0.067 0.110 0.035 0.052 0.260
N 836 553 837 833 831 832
Regions 13 10 13 13 13 13
Countries 6 5 6 6 6 6
Iterations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Comparing the absolute differences in means may underestimate the differ-
ences in effects between France and the other countries because the non-French
respondents were relatively negative towards immigration to begin with and there-
fore could not change after the attacks. Tables 3.4 to 3.5 display the relative
difference in means. These estimates take the possible flooring effect into account
and can be interpreted as the percentage change in attitudes. The effect sizes out-
side France are now at around -10 % in Table 3.4 except for Muslim immigration,
11 The negative reaction towards Jewish immigration is similar to the findings by Echebarria-
Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006), and a possible alternative interpretation is that these results
are a consequence of increased out-group derogation caused by fear of death after the attacks.
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Table 3.5: Relative effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in France
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.049 -0.066 -0.044 -0.054 0.004 -0.070
P-value 0.360 0.220 0.500 0.480 0.950 0.500
N 205 205 206 204 203 204
Regions 3 3 3 3 3 3
Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iterations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
P (diff) 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.05 0.04 0.37
which is at -19 %. Accordingly, the change from absolute to relative difference
reveals a different picture. Outside France, attitudes towards Muslim immigration
are affected the most by the attacks and the effect on attitudes towards Muslim
immigration is around twice the size of the effect on attitudes towards other types
of immigration. In regard to France, there are small differences from the earlier
results, with the estimates, as expected, being a bit larger and in the same direction
as before. However, the differences between France and the other European coun-
tries are now significant for both Muslim and Jewish immigration (at 0.1 and 0.05
respectively) but not for attitudes towards the other types of immigration. Thus,
France seems to have had a significantly less negative reaction towards both Jew-
ish and Muslim immigration than the other countries. For the other estimates, the
differences are not significant.
Discussion
The results showed a negative effect of the Charlie Hebdo attacks on attitudes to-
wards immigration policy in six European countries. This effect was present across
different immigration policy measures and, as could be expected, was strongest
towards Muslim immigration. There was even a negative effect on attitudes to-
wards Jewish immigration. The negative effect on attitudes towards immigration
is similar to the findings from some other studies on the effects of terrorism. In
France the estimates were negative, but smaller and not statistically significant. In
addition, the analyses showed that the French respondents reacted in a significantly
less negative manner than the respondents in other countries, both towards Jewish
and Muslim immigration after the attacks.
Outside France, the respondents became less liberal towards immigration
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policy after the attacks. This is similar to what other studies found in relation
to effects of attacks occurring in European countries (Finseraas, Jakobsson and
Kotsadam 2011). One might have expected the attacks to affect attitudes towards
different types of immigration differently and especially to have reduced support
for Muslim immigration. There is some support for a stronger effect on attitudes
towards Muslim immigration when the baseline levels are taken into account:
namely, the effect on support for Muslim immigration is around twice the size of
the other estimates. The negative effect on immigration attitudes, however, is also
present across other types of immigration policy. The finding of more restrictive
attitudes towards Jewish immigration is especially striking, as Jews were directly
targeted in the Hyper Cacher attack, and one might have expected increased sym-
pathy with Jews to have affected attitudes towards Jewish immigration. However,
the effects seem to be consistent across different groups, and a possible explanation
for this is that the decrease in support for Jewish immigration follows a general neg-
ative reaction towards immigration rather than being a negative reaction towards
Jews in particular. The results outside France seem to point to both a decrease in
support for immigration in general and a specific negative reaction towards Muslim
immigration in particular.
The French respondents reacted differently to the attacks. The results seem
to show that there was no effect of the attacks on the attitudes of the French
respondents. It was expected that the attack on the Hyper Cacher would have
created sympathy with Jews and support for Jewish immigration, but the data did
not support such expectations. Indeed, the estimate for Jewish immigration (very
close to zero) does stand out in the French data. The other estimates, both for
Muslim immigration and other types of immigration, are statistically insignificant,
albeit in a negative direction. Interestingly, when the French results are compared
to the results from the other countries, what stands out is the attitudes towards
immigration of the two groups connected to the attacks: namely, Muslims and
Jews.
In the beginning of the paper, it was hypothesised that three mechanisms at the
domestic level could lead to a domestic reaction different from the international
one. First, higher levels of media coverage could lead to similar but stronger effects
in France. There is no support for this in the data. The French reaction was not a
stronger version of the reaction in the other countries. Higher levels of knowledge
of the attacks in France seem to have had some influence. While the international
reaction was negative across all the different groups except Roma, the French
response seems to have been affected by the specifics of the attacks, and this is
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reflected in the lack of effect on attitudes towards Jewish immigration in France.
The insignificant negative estimates in France do not exclude the possibility of a
smaller negative effect from the attacks in France as well. However, this does not
seem to follow the pattern outside France of a stronger reaction towards Muslims
than towards other groups. Rather, the negative estimates are all on the same level
and are small both in absolute and relative terms.
That the reaction in France was significantly more tolerant towards Muslims
than the reaction in the other European countries points in the direction of the two
other possible mechanisms that may have conditioned the effect of the attacks on
immigration attitudes. These are the elite framing of republican values and the
mobilisation from below around the same values. There is a clear interdependence
between the two, and they are not possible to separate. However, both may have
affected the French reaction to the attacks. On the one hand, the anxious French
public did not see their leaders arguing for the closing of the borders as a response
to the attacks. Thus, these types of policies were not part of the policies that
people considered for creating more security in the aftermath of the attacks. The
choices of framing by President Hollande may have been important in this period.
This does not mean that the president would have gotten support from the public
for every type of framing of the attacks;12 rather, a different framing and less
successful leadership in this period could have led to a less tolerant reaction. On
the other hand, the public manifestations and the broad mobilisation of the French
public may also have been necessary for the relatively tolerant reaction. Through
these manifestations, central frames of the attack were created from below, and
this may have affected the attitudes of the French public as well.
The basis of both the political reaction and the public manifestations is inter-
esting to explore further, especially the conditions for creating such reactions. As
was evident in the French reactions to the subsequent attacks both in Paris and in
Nice, the reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks was not the only possible reaction
by the French politicians or the French public, and Schaefer (2006) shows how the
reaction to recurrent terrorism differs from the reaction to one-time events. Study-
ing what determines the choice of framing after terrorism could give important
insights into the mechanisms behind the effects of terrorism. In the case of the
Charlie Hebdo attacks, the availability of republican values in France may have
been important. In the response to the attacks, the political elite and the French
public already had a framework to build upon in interpreting the attacks and to
12 See for example the discussion of Prime Minister Aznar’s reaction to the attacks in Madrid,
Spain in 2004 in Sinkkonen (2016).
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create a ‘proper response’. The French republican nationalism, with its emphasis
on citizenship rather than lineage and ethnicity, may have facilitated the relatively
tolerant reaction to a higher extent than a more ethnocentric strand of nationalism
would have done. Similarly, the tradition of French laïcité may have inhibited an
anti-Islamic response to the attacks and re-inforced general secular values. Follow-
ing this, it may have been impossible to export the French reaction completely to
other countries, both at the time of the attacks and after other terrorist attacks.
Reactions in other countries have shown that the societal responses to terror-
ism, and especially the responses of political leadership, highlight values that are
perceived as characteristic of the national community (Sinkkonen 2016, p. 337).
Indeed, other values of national relevance could be used by political entrepreneurs.
While the French reaction was dominated by values central in French republican
nationalism, it might be possible to find values with similar effects in other coun-
tries. The Norwegian reaction to the attacks of 22 July, 2011, is a case in point.
Although very different attacks, both in motivation and magnitude, Norwegians
also found solace in values that were perceived as specifically Norwegian, such as
‘openness, democracy and humanity’ (Wollebæk, Enjolras et al. 2012).
This paper has shown that the same terrorist attacks may have different con-
sequences in different countries and, centrally, that the effect in the country stricken
by terrorism may take a qualitatively different character than the effect in other
countries. Terrorist attacks create a domestic political climate that may be ex-
ploited by political entrepreneurs, and their framings may in turn lead to different
types of reactions by the public, both tolerant and intolerant. The reaction to ter-
rorist attacks after 9/11 followed the ‘War on Terror’ discourse for a long time..
In France, however, after Charlie Hebdo, both the central political leadership and
political entrepreneurs converged on a framing that emphasised tolerant French
republican values. This, in turn, seems to have created a more tolerant reaction in
France than was the case in other European countries after the attacks and after
other recent terrorist attacks. The French reaction demonstrates both that the ef-
fects of terrorist attacks are not generated directly by characteristics of the attacks
themselves and that the effects may be contingent on the response to the attacks
by the political elite and the public.
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Appendix
Table 3.6: Effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in six European coun-
tries (regions weight 1)
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.061 -0.068 -0.058 -0.066 -0.062 -0.025
P-value 0.017 0.025 0.044 0.031 0.030 0.430
N 836 553 837 833 831 832
Regions 13 10 13 13 13 13
Countries 6 5 6 6 6 6
Iterations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Table 3.7: Effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in France (regions
weight 1)
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.041 -0.055 -0.034 -0.017 0.009 -0.042
P-value 0.210 0.095 0.370 0.680 0.790 0.410
N 205 205 206 204 203 204
Regions 3 3 3 3 3 3
Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iterations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
P (diff) 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.59
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Table 3.8: Effects from the attacks on immigration attitudes in six European coun-
tries (no weights)
Immigration EU Poor
policy countries countries Muslim Jewish Romani
Estimate -0.048 -0.048 -0.049 -0.060 -0.038 -0.045
P-value 0.007 0.050 0.015 0.009 0.080 0.057
N 836 553 837 833 831 832
Regions 13 10 13 13 13 13
Countries 6 5 6 6 6 6




All or None? A Four-Country
Experiment on How the Threat of




Terrorism is tightly connected to the Muslim minority in the West, and
this could lead to counterterrorism measures targeting Muslims specifically.
This paper uses a unique survey experiment fielded in the US, France, Fin-
land, and Norway to study the levels of support for targeting groups that
vary in both their majority versus minority status and in their connection to
terrorism. Threatening news stories are used to investigate whether or not
the level of support is affected by right-wing extremist and Islamist terrorism.
Finally, the moderating effect of attitudes toward immigration is studied.
People support counterterrorism measures that target threatening groups
(Islamists and right-wing extremists) more than those that do not (Muslims),
but this is not the case for those people who are against immigration. When
people read threatening news stories, there is an increase in support for
counterterrorism measures in general, even measures that target groups unre-
lated to the stories.
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Introduction
Terrorism poses a crucial dilemma for democracies. Terrorists exploit the open
characteristic of democratic societies in order to carry out acts of terrorism. The
extreme nature of terrorist violence may lead the government to counter terror-
ism with similarly extreme means — something that may threaten civil liberties
as well as the liberal and open characteristic of such societies (Wilkinson 2006).
Nevertheless, democracies are thought to excel at counterterrorism measures when
compared to autocracies because their strong commitment to civil liberties serves
as a bulwark against resorting to illiberal and counterproductive security measures
(Abrahms 2007). Recent Islamic terrorist attacks, however, are perpetrated under
conditions that may be more conducive to overreactions than earlier waves of such
attacks. Western countries have both visible Muslim minorities and a salient immi-
gration debate. Because people tend to be more supportive of measures that target
groups other than their own (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003), the terrorist threat may
make people more supportive of policies that directly target the Muslim minority.
Support for counterterrorism measures seems to increase when people perceive
a threat (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, et al. 2005), possibly
because threats increase an individual’s need for protection, and because threats
reduce support for civil liberties (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Marcus, Sullivan,
et al. 1995). This paper asks how the threat of terrorism affects support for counter-
terrorism measures that target different groups; more specifically, how this support
is dependent on the threatening group and the individuals’ prior attitudes toward
immigration.
This paper uses a survey experiment fielded in the US, France, Finland, and
Norway to study the effects of the threat of terrorism on support for counter-
terrorism measures. The experiment presents respondents with news stories report-
ing on an imminent terrorist threat and then asks about their support for counter-
terrorism measures. Because both the group causing the threat and the group being
targeted by the counterterrorism measures are randomized in the experiment, it is
possible to study how the threat of terrorism affects groups that are both related
and unrelated to terrorism. In addition, the experiment asks about both Muslims
and Islamists — two groups that differ in the level of threat that they represent and
in their adherence to democracy. This facilitates the comparison of the baseline
support for measures targeting each group and how the terrorist threat affects these
possible group differences. This experiment gives insight into how the threat of
terrorism affects attitudes toward a central dilemma in democracies: the dilemma
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between civil liberties and security measures.
This dilemma between civil liberties and security measures is central in choos-
ing counterterrorism measures. The battle for the hearts and minds of the people
is important for winning the fight against terrorists (Schuurman 2013), and cre-
ating counterproductive overreactions by security forces is, at times, the goal of
terrorists (Wilkinson 2006). Countries that respect civil liberties have been found
to suffer less from terrorism than other countries (Piazza and Walsh 2010; Walsh
and Piazza 2010), and it is especially the repression of minorities that increases
terrorism (Piazza 2017). Indeed, Abrahms (2007) argues that democracies are
especially effective at countering terrorism because their strong support for civil
liberties serves as a bulwark against overreactions that may give legitimacy to the
terrorists. While democratic publics support civil liberties in an abstract sense,
they are less inclined to support the liberties of specific groups, and groups that
are perceived as threatening or undemocratic are not tolerated to the same extent
as others (Marcus, Sullivan, et al. 1995; Sniderman et al. 2014). It is unclear if
this support for civil liberties does, in fact, protect democracies from implement-
ing illiberal policies targeting minorities such as Muslims. Research has found
that the threat of terrorism is associated with higher levels of support for abstract
counterterrorism measures and for measures targeting more specific groups related
to terrorism (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, et al. 2005; Huddy,
Feldman, and Weber 2007). The effects of the terrorist threat across different
groups has not been compared or studied to determine if such a threat only affects
attitudes toward related groups. The following section presents the extant research
on support for civil liberties and support for counterterrorism measures. Special
emphasis is placed on both the threat and importance of the group background
of both the groups carrying out attacks and the groups targeted by the counter-
terrorism measures. The survey experiment and data are then presented, followed
by the results from the analyses. Finally, the findings and their implications are
discussed.
Threat and support for security measures
Terrorism has been found to increase support for counterterrorism measures. Peo-
ple who feel threatened by terrorism support counterterrorism measures over civil
liberties to a higher extent than others (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy, Feldman,
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Taber, et al. 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber 2007).1 This correlation is sup-
ported by a study of the effects of the 7/7 attacks in London (Bozzoli and Müller
2011) and by studies using experimentally induced threats (Haider-Markel, Joslyn,
and Al-Baghal 2006; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Malhotra and Popp 2012).
So far, most research studying the connection between terrorist threats and counter-
terrorism measures asks about either the abstract and general measures or the tar-
geting of a specific group, such as Arabs or Muslims. It is yet unclear if the higher
support when under threat is driven by a higher general support for security mea-
sures, if it is an increase in the support for targeting specific groups, or both.2 In
addition, while the political cleavage on immigration seems to be more important
by the day, there are few studies on how attitudes toward immigration moderate the
effects of a given threat. Below, the extant research is discussed, and this discussion
leads to four hypotheses. There are theoretical reasons to expect that the terrorist
threat has both a general effect and a specific effect on attitudes toward the groups
creating the threat. Moreover, it is reasoned that there are baseline differences in
support for targeting different groups and the support for targeting different groups
being connected to attitudes toward immigration and that the effects may differ
between the four countries.
Research on the political effects of anxiety has found that people change their
policy preferences when they feel threatened. Albertson and Gadarian (2015, p. 5)
show that threats lead to anxiety and that anxious individuals support security
policies to a higher extent than others. However, this support is contingent on
the interpretation of the policies as enhancing security. When a policy is not
perceived as threat protection, it is not supported to a higher extent by anxious
individuals. An experiment on support for counterterrorism measures by Haider-
Markel, Joslyn, and Al-Baghal (2006) supports this finding. Reminding people
of the terrorist threat increases support for protective policies, but this is only the
case for policies that are directly connected to the type of terrorism people are
reminded of.3 Following this logic, the threat of terrorism could be expected to
increase support for targeting the relevant terrorist groups and possibly increase
1 This is indeed the case for crime in general as well, see Mondak and Hurwitz (2012).
2 Terrorism has a negative effect on attitudes toward out-groups, and Echebarria-Echabe and
Fernández-Guede (2006) even find terrorism to affect attitudes toward unrelated out-groups such as
Jews after the March 11 2004 attacks in Madrid (see also Das et al. 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister
2009, ch. 3, for similar findings).
3 Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) also find that the Mumbai terrorist attacks increased perceptions
of threat from terrorism in Europe, but that the attacks did not increase support for security measures.
This may be interpreted as a consequence of the lack of relevance of the attacks for domestic security
policies.
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support for counterterrorism measures in general. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The threat of terrorism increases support for counterterrorism mea-
sures in general (a) and more specifically for measures targeting the group creating
the threat (b).
Support for counterterrorism measures is contingent on support for civil lib-
erties. Combating terrorism is difficult and fundamental civil liberties are often
threatened by counterterrorism measures. Support for civil liberties may accord-
ingly be a bulwark against illiberal and undemocratic measures. Literature on
political tolerance has been preoccupied with differences in the support for civil
liberties of different groups since Stouffer’s seminal study (1955). Studies find
broad support for abstract civil liberties, but people are more restrictive when these
liberties are applied to specific groups (Petersen et al. 2011; Sniderman et al. 2014;
Steen-Johnsen, Fladmoe, and Midtbøen 2016). Two explanations have been pro-
posed for these group-based differences in tolerance: one is based on the effects
of anxiety and the other is based on the target group’s adherence to democracy.
Marcus, Sullivan, et al. (1995) argue that people become anxious when asked
about groups they perceive as threatening. Anxiety decreases reliance on prior
convictions (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), and anxious people reevalu-
ate their support for the civil liberties of the threatening groups. They come to a
different conclusion than when asked about their support for civil liberties in an
abstract sense. Assuming that terrorism increases anxiety, one may expect that
terrorism reduces support for civil liberties in general. A reduction in support for
civil liberties could in turn mean higher support for counterterrorism measures
in general (Davis and Silver 2004) and increased support for targeting unrelated
groups. Sniderman et al. (2014) and Petersen et al. (2011) find differences in toler-
ance that follow the same pattern, but their interpretation is different. Rather than
pointing to anxiety, they argue that tolerance is dependent on a group’s acceptance
of “the rules of the larger society” (Sniderman et al. 2014, p. 145). They find that
while Muslims are seen as accepting the rules and are only categorized as “out of
the mainstream”, Islamic fundamentalists are not seen as accepting these rules and
are seen as transgressive and undemocratic. The civil liberties of Muslims are thus
supported to a larger extent than those of Islamic fundamentalists. To support this
argument, Sniderman et al. (2014) show similar patterns of support for the civil
liberties of other pairs of groups where one is transgressive and the other is not.
Few studies exist that research the support for security measures targeting dif-
ferent groups. Christensen and Aars (2017) find that Norwegians support surveil-
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lance of threatening groups such as Islamic fundamentalists more than they support
surveillance of comparatively democratic groups such as a Muslim congregation.
Therefore, support for surveillance seems to be lower for groups granted extensive
civil liberties, according to Sniderman et al. (2014) and Marcus, Sullivan, et al.
(1995). Piazza (2015), however, did not find this expected pattern. He asked peo-
ple about what the police should do with the perpetrators of a terrorist attack in a
survey experiment and did not find higher support for the prolonged detention of
Islamic fundamentalists compared to Muslims. However, in this experiment, both
groups are described as having already perpetrated a terrorist attack. Accordingly,
both groups are presented as threatening and violating core democratic norms, and
the lack of difference in effects may be explained by the experiment itself. These
results could indicate that the terrorist threat should reduce the differences in sup-
port for civil liberties for Muslims relative to Islamic fundamentalists. Still, this
was not the case in the study of the reactions to the caricature crisis in Denmark
(Sniderman et al. 2014). Accordingly, it may be the case that people perceive
democratic groups as more transgressive when reminded of the terrorist threat
from members of the group. This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. There is higher support for counterterrorism measures targeting
transgressive or threatening groups than for measures targeting other, more demo-
cratic, groups (a). Threats increase the support for targeting democratic groups,
thereby reducing the difference between the two types of groups (b).
The two most common types of terrorists, Islamic and right-wing extremist
terrorists, are both connected to the salient political cleavage on immigration. The
support for targeting these groups may be connected to immigration preferences.
On the one hand, a central determinant of attitudes toward immigration is the
perceived threat from immigration (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016;
Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin 2008; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 2015),
and there are even fringe conspiracy theories concerning a “Muslim invasion” of
Europe (Fekete 2012). People who react negatively toward immigration may be
more supportive of measures that target Muslims and also view the difference
between Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists as smaller than other groups (see
also findings in Petersen et al. 2011; Sniderman et al. 2014). On the other
hand, research has shown that people are less supportive of measures that target
themselves than other measures (Best, Krueger, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2011;
Sun, Wu, and Poteyeva 2011; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003). It may be that those
who view immigration in a negative light will be less supportive of targeting right-
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wing extremist terrorists, as doing so could infringe on their own rights.4 This
leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The support for security measures targeting different groups vary
with attitudes toward immigration (a); specifically, the difference between Muslims
and Islamists may be smaller for people who feel negatively about immigration
(b).
While the mechanisms described above may be general mechanisms, they rely
on evaluations that may vary between national contexts. This study uses data from
four countries: Finland, France, Norway, and the US, and there is reason to believe
that differences between these countries may lead to different levels of support
for security measures and that country characteristics may moderate the effects
of the terrorist threat. While France and the US have suffered recent large-scale
attacks by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, the only terrorist attack in Norway was
carried out by a right-wing extremist. Malkki, Fridlund, and Sallamaa (2018) show
that Finland has experienced attacks that could have been construed as terrorism,
such as multiple school shootings and the bombing at the Myyarmanni shopping
center. However, these events were not defined as terrorism in the Finnish debate.5
These differences in the type of terrorism experienced could cause differences in
the baseline support for targeting different groups and even affect the responses
to the experimental threats. Islamic terrorism is covered by the media to a high
extent in all four countries, and the threat from Islamic terrorism is salient in the
two countries that have not experienced Islamic terrorism. Thus, there is little
reason to expect a quantitatively or qualitatively different effect regarding Islamic
terrorism. Right-wing extremist attacks have primarily occurred in the US and
Norway, so it is possible that this affects the baseline levels of support for targeting
such right-wing extremists and that it moderates the effect of being reminded of
the threat from these groups. The direction of these effects is unclear, however.
On the one hand, one could expect prior experiences to increase the perceptions of
danger from the threat, thus increasing the effect of being reminded of it in these
countries. On the other, the threat may be more salient even when people are not
4 Piazza (2015) does find that people are both more supportive of targeting Muslims relative
to right-wing extremists and that this difference is larger for people who do not believe that dis-
crimination is a problem and that do not support equal rights. These questions were however asked
after the experimental treatment something that could be problematic, see Montgomery, Nyhan,
and Torres (2018).
5 The first Islamic attack in Finland, the knife attack in Turku in August 2017, transpired after
the fielding of the survey used here.
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reminded of it and the treatment effect may thus be lower. The last hypothesis
suggests that there are differences by country:
Hypothesis 4. Support for security measures targeting different groups varies
between countries (a) and prior experience with different types of terrorism mod-
erates the effects of the terrorist news stories (b).
Method and data
This paper is based on data from a comparative survey originally fielded in five
countries (Norway, Finland, France, the US and Spain) in January and February
2017 as part of the Disruptive Events Project.6 Because of differences in the survey
experiment design, data from only four of the countries (Norway, Finland, France
and the US) are used and the sample size is around 2000 respondents per country.
Descriptive statistics are printed in Tables 4.4 to 4.5 in the appendix.7
The analysis is based on a survey experiment where people were asked to
read a newspaper story and then answer questions concerning counterterrorism
measures. In the first part of the survey experiment, the respondents were asked
to read one newspaper story. The story was chosen at random from a pool of
four different stories (see the appendix for an example). Three of the stories
described an impending terrorist attack where the perpetrators were either domestic
Islamic extremists, recently immigrated Islamic extremists, or domestic right-wing
extremists. The fourth story was a control story unrelated to terrorism. For the
analyses, the two news stories about Islamic terrorism were combined into one.
The news stories were designed to create an emotional reaction in the respondents
and to resemble regular news articles.
In the second part of the experiment, the respondents were asked about their
views on counterterrorism measures targeting a group. The respondents were
asked about only one of four different groups, and this group varied orthogonally
6 A comparative project including Norway, France, Finland, Spain and the US. It is funded
through the Research Council of Norway’s SAMRISK program.
7 Figures 4.10 to 4.11 in the appendix plot balance tests between the experimental and control
groups. The experimental groups are quite balanced on observable characteristics. The black
squares plot the thresholds proposed by Rubin (2001), i.e. that the absolute standardized difference
in means should be below .25 and the variance ratio between 0.5 and 2.5. The figure design is
borrowed from Legewie (2013).
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with the groups in the news story. The first three were “Islamists,”8 “Muslims,”
and “right-wing extremists.” The final control group was “people.” The question
was introduced with the text: “In the current situation, with many terrorist attacks
in the past year, to what extent do you think the government should be allowed to:”
and the following questions are those for respondents in the “Islamists”-group:9
• “hold Islamists in custody as long as they wish without putting them on
trial?”
• “randomly stop and search Islamists on the street?”
• “surveil the e-mail accounts of Islamists?”
The respondents answered on a four-point scale ranging from “should absolutely
not have the right to” to “should absolutely have the right to,” and the three items
were combined in an additive index with a Crohnbach’s alpha of .84 and recoded
to go from 0 to 1.10 The respondents were first exposed to either one of the three
threatening news stories or the control story. Then they were asked about security
measures targeting one specific group. The groups could be the same as in the
news stories or they could be different. This way, it was possible to study the effect
of being exposed to a news story about terrorism on supporting counterterrorism
measures and whether it matters that the story was about the same or a different
group than the one being targeted in the questions.
The choice of groups facilitates two important comparisons (see table 4.1 on
the facing page). On the one hand, it is possible to compare the effect of the ter-
rorist threat on the answers concerning Islamists and Muslims. These two groups
have similar religious beliefs, but are different in their political legitimacy and
acceptance of democracy. On the other hand, Islamists can be compared to right-
wing extremists — a group that has a different political motivation but is similar
8 It is possible that some respondents do not recognize the difference between Islamists and
Muslims. As will be clear in the analysis however, the results are different for the two groups,
but this difference may be smaller than what would have been the case had a different term such
as “Islamic fundamentalists” been used (as was used by Sniderman et al. 2014). In a study of
Norwegian respondents by Steen-Johnsen, Fladmoe, and Midtbøen (2016, ch. 4), the respondents
did not differ in their views on Islamists relative to Muslims when asked about allowing the groups
to use of a municipal building, but did do so when asked about members of the groups being hired
as a teacher. Norwegian respondents thus exhibited an understanding of the groups being different,
but this did not affect all measure of tolerance. However, by including a threatening scenario it
will be possible to study how if this holds up under threat as Islamists should be more strongly
connected to the threat than Muslims.
9 The word “Islamists” were changed to “Muslims”, “right-wing extremists” and “people” for
the other groups.
10 The Crohnbach’s alpha varies between 0.71 and 0.90 in the different combinations of news
stories, groups and countries.
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Table 4.1: Targets in the Experiment
Majority Minority
Democratic/Non-threatening - Muslims
Undemocratic/Threatening Right-wing extremists Islamists
in its rejection of democracy. It is possible to compare both how legitimacy of the
group and how the majority/minority background of the groups affect tolerance
and support for security measures.
A problem with this survey design is that the respondents may not have read
the news story. To reduce the probability of including respondents that opted out
of the treatment, the final analyses only include respondents that remained on the
page of the news story for at least half of the median time spent on the page in
the country. This excluded around 400 of the almost 7000 respondents and had
the expected consequence of leading to stronger and less noisy treatment effects.11
However, even when including all respondents, the effects were consistent. The
surveys were fielded at a time of high terrorist threat levels in the four countries,
and the news stories could be considered comparable to what many respondents
would experience regularly in newspapers and on television. Therefore, the effects
present in this study may be considered on the lower end of the scale of what would
happen after a terrorist attack. In addition, the questions on counter-terrorism did
not follow directly after the news stories. The respondents first answered questions
about their emotional reaction to the news stories (7), their trust level regarding
different groups (10), and on civil liberties (1). This accounts for a total of 18
questions after the news stories.12 Since the effects of reading the news stories may
diminish over time, the effects found here are on the lower end of what could be
expected in a real-world setting. In addition, the introductory text to the questions
reminds people of the present terrorist threat and could thus increase the perceived
threat experienced by people in the control group who had not read a threatening
news story.
To measure attitudes toward immigration, respondents were asked about their
views on immigration before the news stories. The questions were introduced with
the sentence, “In the current situation, to what extent would you agree with the
11 About 100 respondents are removed per country ranging from 99 in Norway to 116 in Finland.
12 The civil liberties questions concerned the same groups as the questions on security measures.
The respondents were thus asked about their support for the civil liberties of a Muslim, Islamist or
right-wing extremist group or The Red Cross, before the questions on counter-terrorist measures.
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following statements:” and in the US the statements were:13
• “There are too many immigrants in the US”
• “Islam is a threat to the West”
• “American natives should have priority in employment compared to foreign-
ers”
• “Immigration is a source of cultural enrichment”
• “Children born in the US to immigrant parents are as American as anyone
else”
The respondents answered on a four-point scale ranging from “disagree strongly”
to “agree strongly”. These five questions were used to create an additive index
(with a Chronbachs alpha of 0.85) where respondents who answered on at least
four of the questions were included.14 The index was recoded to go from 0 to 1,
with 1 denoting a very negative attitude toward immigration.
The following analysis begins with comparing the baseline differences in sup-
port for security measures. The terrorism threat experiment is then introduced and
the possible consequences of a terrorist threat are examined. Finally, the effects
of the moderating role of immigration attitudes is investigated and the effects are
compared across the different countries. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is
used to assure comparability across the different regression models (Mood 2009),
and marginal effects are used to increase the ease of interpretation (Leeper 2018).15
Results
The results from the first five OLS models are printed in Table 4.2 on the next
page. The first model is a baseline model that includes only the control variables
and attitudes toward immigration. In this model, only the untreated respondents
are included; that is, the people reading the control story and being asked about
counterterrorism measures targeting “people”. Model 2 includes respondents who
read the threatening news stories and variables denoting which news story they
read. Similarly, model 3 includes the different target groups of the second part
of the experiment and the variables denoting the different groups that were asked
about. Finally, models 4 and 5 include both parts of the experiment, and model 5
includes the interaction effects between the two groups and news stories.
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Table 4.2: Support for security measures
Security index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.138 0.300∗∗ 0.344∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.326∗∗
(0.117) (0.056) (0.063) (0.031) (0.032)
Finland 0.190∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.041) (0.019) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
France 0.246∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.093∗∗
(0.040) (0.019) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Norway 0.118∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.020 0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.041) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.009. 0.003 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared −0.0001 −0.00001 −0.0001. −0.00005∗∗ −0.00005∗∗
(0.0001) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Education −0.031 0.004 −0.020 −0.022∗∗ −0.022∗∗
(0.031) (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
Female −0.041 −0.024. −0.026. −0.015∗ −0.016∗
(0.028) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
Immigration 0.462∗∗ 0.452∗∗ 0.500∗∗ 0.500∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.013) (0.013)
Islamic Attack 0.039∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.040∗
(0.016) (0.008) (0.016)
R-W Attack 0.045∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.047∗
(0.018) (0.010) (0.019)
Muslims −0.122∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.121∗∗
(0.019) (0.010) (0.019)
Islamists 0.015 −0.005 0.016
(0.020) (0.010) (0.019)
R-W Extremists −0.012 −0.010 −0.012
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020)
Islamic Attack X Muslims −0.003
(0.023)
R-W Attack X Muslims −0.025
(0.027)
Islamic Attack X Islamists −0.016
(0.024)
R-W Attack X Islamists −0.051.
(0.027)
Islamic Attack X R-W Extremists 0.007
(0.024)
R-W Attack X R-W Extremists −0.006
(0.027)
N 451 1689 1593 6535 6535
R-squared 0.119 0.266 0.238 0.271 0.272
Adj. R-squared 0.106 0.261 0.233 0.270 0.270
. p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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Figure 4.1: Marginal effects of the
news stories for different groups
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Figure 4.2: Marginal effects of the
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Beginning with the first model, there are significant differences in the control
group across the four countries, with the lowest support for security measures
in the US and the highest in France. The correlation between immigration and
support for security measures is .43 and statistically significant. In model 2, the
news stories are included. Both of the news stories increase support for security
measures and the other estimates stay more or less the same. In model 3, the
news stories are removed and the background of the target group is included. The
support for security measures seems to vary primarily between Muslims and the
other groups, and people are less willing to target Muslims. For the two other
groups, the support is similar to the “people”-group. The estimated effects of
the news stories are smaller when both the news stories and the target groups are
included.
13 The text in italics varied with the country where the survey was fielded.
14 Chronbach’s alpha varies between 0.82 and 0.88 in the four countries.
15 All analyses were run in R (R Core Team 2018) and replication code is available on the
author’s website.
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Finally, the last model includes interaction estimates for the two experiments.
To interpret this model, the marginal effects of the interactions are plotted in fig-
ures 4.1 to 4.2 on the facing page. These figures show the effect of being exposed
to the news stories about different sub-groups (figure 4.1) and the effects of the
different groups for respondents exposed to the different news stories (figure 4.2).
Beginning with figure 4.1, the effects of the news stories seem to depend on the
target of the security measures being the same group as the news story. Support for
targeting Muslims is only affected by the Islamic attack story, while the effect on
Islamists is in the same direction but not significant. The right-wing attack news
story does not change the support for targeting either Muslims or Islamists. For
the people group and the right-wing extremist group, there are effects observed
from both news stories, and people become more positive about targeting both
groups when they have read the terrorist news stories relative to when they read
the control story. The marginal effects of the groups are plotted in figure 4.2. Here,
the pattern is more stable, with relatively similar marginal effects of the group
across news stories. However, for both Muslims and Islamists, there seems to be
a slightly negative respondent pattern for those who read the right-wing terrorism
news story. The respondents reading this story support the targeting of Islamists to
a lower extent than targeting people (statistically significant at .1). However, this
may be caused by both a negative effect on support for targeting these groups and
a larger positive effect of targeting “people”.
Returning to the hypotheses, the results so far seem to support hypotheses 1a
and 2a. There is higher support for security measures in general by people who
have read the news stories (H1a), and there is a difference in support for targeting
Muslims relative to the other three groups (H2a). Hypothesis 1b is difficult to
evaluate. On the one hand, the right-wing terrorist news did not increase support
for targeting Muslims and Islamists. On the other, the Islamic terrorism news story
did increase support for targeting right-wing extremists and people. Hypothesis
2b seems to receive some support. There is stronger evidence of an effect from
the Islamic terrorist news story on support for targeting Muslims rather than Is-
lamists. The estimates on support for targeting Islamists are not significant, and
the differences in size between the estimates are also small and not significant.
Immigration attitudes
To measure how immigration attitudes may moderate the relationship between
threat, target groups, and policy support, interactions between immigration atti-
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tudes and the survey experiment are included in the three models in table 4.3 in
the appendix. The predicted support for security measures is plotted in figure 4.3.
This figure shows how support (of the group reading the control news story) for
security measures is dependent on target group affiliation and prior attitudes to-
ward immigration. Beginning with immigration attitudes, the predicted support
for security measures targeting the first three groups seems to be dependent on
attitudes toward immigration, and the more negative a person is, the more the
person supports security measures. For the last group — right-wing extremists —
this is not the case. This relationship is slightly curve-linear, but support seems to
be quite stable across attitudes toward immigration.





































Figure 4.4: Marginal effects of the news story on support for targeting different




















































The marginal effects of the news stories for the different groups and for dif-
ferent attitudes toward immigration are plotted in Figure 4.4. In the plots, the
news stories are compared to the control story and only the difference from the
control story is plotted.16 Beginning with people and Muslims, there is a positive
effect with the Islamic news story. This effect is curve-linear and only affects
the people who show medium support for immigration. The estimated effect of
the right-wing extremist news story is positive for targeting Muslims by people
who are relatively negative toward immigration, but it is only significant at the .1
level for a few attitude types toward immigration. In addition, this group seems
to increase their support for targeting “people”. Moving to Islamists, there are no
statistically significant effects with either of the news stories. Both of the news
stories increase support for targeting right-wing extremists in the bottom right plot.
16 The dashed line may be interpreted as the effect of the control story.
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However, while the Islamic news story primarily affects the respondents who are
the most negative toward immigration, there is a curve-linear relationship between
immigration attitudes and the effect of the right-wing extremist news story. While
it increases support for security measures among those whose attitudes toward
immigration are in the middle, the respondents at the extreme ends of the scale are
not affected by the news story.
The group effects in figure 4.5, show a similar pattern. Here, the marginal
effects of being asked about a group are plotted, and the control group comprises
those asked about “people”. Relative to the “people” group, the respondents are
less willing to target Muslims for all news story treatments, and this is evident from
the line for Muslims being below the dotted line. However, support for targeting
Muslims increases the more negative one is toward immigration; for the people
most negative toward immigration, there is higher support for targeting Muslims
rather than “people”. The pattern for Islamists is similar to the one for Muslims,
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Figure 4.6: Marginal effects of the news story by targeted group in the different
countries
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but there is more support for targeting Islamists across all levels of immigration
attitudes except for the respondents who are the most negative toward immigration.
The pattern is the exact opposite for right-wing extremist (“RWE” in the plot). The
respondents who feel negatively about immigration feel negatively about targeting
right-wing extremists relative to people, while those more positive to immigration
are conversely positive toward targeting right-wing extremists.
The effect of the target group does not seem to vary much between the news
stories. There is a slightly more negative attitude toward targeting Islamists relative
to “people” by the respondents reading the right-wing terrorism story. In addition,
the combination of a right-wing extremist news story and being asked about tar-
geting right-wing extremists make those most negative toward immigration even
more negative regarding targeting right-wing extremists relative to people. This
is not the case for people with more positive attitudes toward immigration: if the
news story has any effect, it is positive. The effect of the news story treatment is
thus the opposite of the expected pattern for the people who are the most negative
toward immigration.
Going back to the third hypothesis, there is some support for both of its parts.
There is higher support for security measures among people with negative attitudes
toward immigration (H3a) when they are asked about Muslims, Islamists and
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“people”. However, this is not the case when targeting right-wing extremists. The
relationship between immigration attitudes and support for security measures is
thus dependent on the group being targeted by the measures. The last part of
the hypothesis (H3b) is also supported. Those most negative toward immigration
do not distinguish between Muslims and Islamists. Rather, those most negative
toward immigration support targeting both groups to the same extent.
Country differences
To test if there are important country differences, the full model was run with an
interaction between country, immigration, and the two experimental treatments.
The predicted support is plotted in figure 4.9 in the appendix. This support shows
a similar pattern as that in the pooled model for the four countries. However, in
the US, the support for targeting right-wing extremists seems to follow the same
positive correlation with attitudes toward immigration as the three other groups.
This is not the case in the three other countries and these are more similar to the
results in the pooled model.
Moving to the marginal effects in figures 4.6 to 4.7 on pages 121–135, there are
some differences between the countries. Two countries seem to stand out regarding
the effects of the news stories. First, in France, there seem to be smaller effects
than those observed in other countries, and it is the right-wing extremist news
story that has the largest estimates (in regards to support for targeting right-wing
extremists and Muslims). This may indicate that the Islamic terrorist threat was
so present in the French respondents’ thoughts that the experiment did not change
their attitudes.17 Before January 2017, France had suffered a wave of Islamic
terrorism, with the most recent large-scale attack being the one in Nice in July
the year before. The right-wing extremist terrorist story may have presented the
respondents with new information that affected their support (only significant at
.1).
The Norwegian estimates also deviate from the general findings and effects
in the three other countries. The effect of the right-wing extremist news story
on support for targeting Muslims is negative (albeit not significant), whereas it is
positive in the other countries. For the other countries, there are positive estimates
for this effect (significant at .1 in France and Finland) and removing Norway from
17 There are indeed indications that the French public reacted differently to the publics in other
countries after the Charlie Hebdo attacks as well. While French respondents did not change their
policy preferences, people in other European countries did (Solheim 2017).
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the pooled analyses reveals a significant (.05) and positive effect of the right-wing
extremist news story on support for targeting Muslims at about the same size as
the effect of the Islamic news story (not printed). The Norwegian reaction to the
right-wing extremist news story can be better understood in light of the Norwegian
experience with the right-wing extremist attacks in 2011 and the mobilization that
came in the aftermath. Indeed, multiple studies show a positive effect from the
attacks on attitudes toward minorities (Jakobsson and Blom 2014; Solheim 2018;
Wollebæk et al. 2013). It is thus possible that being reminded of this terror threat
led Norwegians to mobilize in a tolerant direction.
Figure 4.7 plots the effects of the groups’ backgrounds for the different news
treatments in the different countries. The general pattern is again not present in
France, where support for targeting right-wing extremists is at the same level as
support for targeting Muslims and is well below the support for targeting both
Islamists and “people”. The difference in support for targeting Muslims relative
to “people” varies, with no difference in the US, and larger differences in Finland
and France. The largest difference is observed in Norway. However, the difference
in support for targeting Islamists relative to Muslims seems stable between the
countries.
Discussion
This paper started out with a discussion on the possible consequences of terrorism
in the West, where a domestic Muslim minority is combined with a threat from
Islamic terrorism and a highly salient debate on immigration. The introduction
questioned whether this situation would facilitate overreactions toward terrorism
because it may be easier to target minorities such as Muslims than it is to target
members of the majority. Indeed, it has been found that people are more support-
ive of measures targeting others (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003) and that Western
countries with larger Muslim minorities have enacted laws that directly target im-
migrants to a higher extent than other countries (Epifanio 2016). The literature
on civil liberties and counterterrorism measures, however, is divided on the con-
sequences of such threats. On the one hand, there is an optimistic view of seeing
support for civil liberties as a bulwark against overreactions, arguing that people
can distinguish between threatening and non-threatening groups and that a threat
only increases support for measures targeting the causes of the threat. On the other,
there is a more pessimistic view that a threat reduces support for civil liberties
123
in general and that the threat from terrorism and from immigration may reduce
people’s ability to differentiate between groups. As one could expect, the results
do not support just one of these views, but there are reasons for both optimism and
pessimism depending on interpretation and what results one is interested in.
The first finding is in clear support for the differentiation between different
groups (H2a). The respondents do not support counterterrorism measures against
all groups to the same extent, and this seems to follow the expected pattern where
there is more support for targeting Islamists and right-wing extremists and less
support for targeting Muslims (see also Christensen and Aars 2017). Muslims are
thus not conflated with Islamists and do not seem to be perceived as a threatening
group. Interestingly, targeting the control group of “people”, was supported to a
higher extent than targeting Muslims. This support was closer in degree to the
two threatening groups (except for in the US). This is puzzling, as one could have
expected that the respondents would interpret “people” as a category that they
themselves were members of and would be more negative toward only the threat-
ening groups. One possible explanation is that the respondents interpreted the
“people” category as one that included the threatening groups, but not people like
themselves. The correlation between support for targeting “people” and attitudes
toward immigration is interesting because it follows the same pattern as support
for targeting Muslims and Islamists. There is a positive correlation between immi-
gration attitudes and support for targeting Muslims, Islamists, and people, but this
is not the case for right-wing extremists. Since this pattern is not present in the
support for targeting right-wing extremists, it is possible that the respondents have
interpreted the “people” group in this context as a group connected to Islamists.
A second possibility is that the respondents are particularly negative toward
measures that target Muslims. The measures asked about were: hold in custody
indefinitely, random searches on the street, and surveillance of e-mail accounts.
These may have been seen as illegitimate when targeting Muslims, but not when
the target is more broadly or more narrowly defined. The respondents may thus
paradoxically see the broader measure as less invasive because the targets comprise
the total population rather than a smaller legitimate subgroup. The results here
indicate that people are more sensitive toward measures that target specific sub-
groups when the groups are not threatening or transgressive than toward measures
that target the whole population. The idea that support for civil liberties may serve
as a bulwark against ineffective overreactions thus receives some support here
(Abrahms 2007). This is crucial because repressing minority rights — especially
religious expressions — causes grievances that in turn have been found to lead to
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terrorism (Piazza 2017). For terrorist groups, the creation of such overreactions
is indeed a goal, as it may increase terrorist group support relative to the state
(Wilkinson 2006).
At the beginning of the analysis, the effects of a threat did not fully conform
with neither the expectations based on Marcus, Sullivan, et al. (1995) (H1a) nor
Albertson and Gadarian (2015) (H1b). On the one hand, targeting right-wing
extremists received more support from respondents who had read about both right-
wing extremist and Islamic terrorism. On the other, there was also an increase in
support for targeting Muslims, but this only happened for the people who had read
the Islamic terrorism news story. When the analyses were run with an interaction
across countries, however, there emerged an interesting pattern. There was a
positive effect from the right-wing extremist news story on support for targeting
Muslims in the US, France, and Finland, but not in Norway. This effect in the
pooled sample without Norway was even the same size as the effect of the Islamic
news story. The effects found here thus seem to follow the expectations from
Marcus, Sullivan, et al. (1995), in that anxiety reduces support for civil liberties
in general. This then leads to increased support for counterterrorism measures in
general and not only toward the specific group causing the threat (H1a).
In the Norwegian case, it is possible that the experience of the right-wing
extremist terrorist attacks in 2011 led to a different reaction toward the right-wing
extremist news story. After the attacks, it is important to note that the framing by
the political leadership and in public demonstrations emphasized tolerance as a
response to the attacks. Research has also found that the public both increased
its out-group trust and support for a liberal immigration policy (Jakobsson and
Blom 2014; Solheim 2018; Wollebæk et al. 2013). It is possible that this may
have created a different reaction to the news story than in the other countries (H4)
and why Norwegians thus did not increase their support for targeting Muslims
after reading about right-wing extremist terrorism. Similarly, the minor effects
found in France regarding the news stories may indicate that the terrorist threat
was already highly salient in that country. French respondents thus did not change
their attitudes to the same extent as the other respondents after reading the stories.
These possible consequence of past experiences with terrorism could be interesting
to research in further comparative studies.
The results show that, rather than reacting only to the undemocratic and threat-
ening groups, people increase their support for targeting the democratic groups as
well. This goes against the optimistic findings from Denmark (Sniderman et al.
2014). This may be caused by important differences between the terrorist threat
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and the Danish debate on caricatures. There are more consistent effects on the
support for targeting Muslims and for targeting Islamists. This could indicate that
the baseline support for targeting Islamists is higher because it considers the trans-
gressive characteristics of the group (Sniderman et al. 2014), or perhaps because
thinking about Islamists makes people anxious (Marcus, Sullivan, et al. 1995).
Reminding people of the threat from this group may not change their perceptions
of Islamists as much as it does for targeting Muslims, and democratic groups may
seem more transgressive when reminded of terrorism. While Piazza (2015) found
similar levels of support for targeting the two groups, the reduction in difference
regarding support for targeting Muslims relative to Islamists is not statistically sig-
nificant in the analyses here. However, the treatments in these two studies could be
seen as the two extremes of a scale and should be further explored through studies
using treatments that are stronger than those used here, but while not defining the
Muslim group as terrorists, which was done by Piazza (2015).
The inclusion of immigration attitudes in the analyses also shows that there are
respondents who do not perceive a difference between Muslims and Islamists (H3).
While the majority supports targeting Islamists to a higher extent than targeting
Muslims, this is not the case for those who are the most negative toward immigra-
tion. This group does not seem to distinguish between Muslims and Islamists and
supports the targeting of both groups to a very high extent. The attitudes toward
targeting Islamists and Muslims seem to be intrinsically connected to attitudes
toward immigration and moving from one end of the scale to the other on immigra-
tion means moving three quarters of the scale on support for security. The public
seems very divided on this matter, and none of the experimental treatments have a
similarly sized effect.
This paper has shown that there are clear baseline differences in support for
targeting Muslims relative to Islamists and right-wing extremists. This is an im-
portant distinction to make and shows that the public does not conflate Islamists
with Muslims in general. However, this distinction is reduced when people are
reminded of terrorism and is not even made by people who are very negative to-
ward immigration. Therefore, it is possible that stronger reminders of terrorism,
such as real world attacks, would reduce it further and that continued debates over
immigration may lead more people to see the two groups as the same. There are
also some indications of a correlation between immigration attitudes and support
for targeting “people”. Coupled with the finding of increased support for targeting
“people” when under a terrorist threat, this may indicate that respondents perceived
the “people” category as being associated with Islamists or Muslims. It is also pos-
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sible that an increase in support for counterterrorism policies in general is larger
because the respondents do not consider themselves as part of the group being
targeted. This could mean that the current wave of Islamic terrorism might lead
to higher support for illiberal counterterrorism measures than for other types of
terrorism that are less connected to out-groups.
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Appendix: Newspaper story example
We’re interested in how people understand what they read in the news. Please read
this recent article from a national newspaper and we’ll ask you some questions
about it afterwards
The Ministry of Justice called for a press conference:
Fear of terror attacks in Norway
The Ministry of Justice urges local law enforcement to increase surveillance after
the discovery of suspicious documents in an Oslo apartment.
The documents purportedly plan a large-scale Paris-style terrorist attack against
a variety of public targets, including government building, schools, and athletic
stadiums in Norway, said a spokesperson of the Ministry of Justice when they
today, on short notice called a press conference.
Connections to Islamic extremist groups
The apartment where the documents were found was rented to two young men
who recently arrived in Norway from Iraq. According to sources we have spoken
to, the two men are supposed to have ties with the Islamic State terrorist group.
Documents found on their laptops are said to contain concrete plans for a major
terrorist attack in Oslo in the coming weeks.
“We have reason to believe that the men could be working with Islamic State
cells in other cities to attack civilians in one large event like the bombings in
Paris in November 2015 or in smaller, coordinated events like the attacks in recent
months like in Nice or in Brussels”, said the representative of the Ministry of
Justice.
Difficult to prevent
There are a growing number of warnings from top security officials about the threat
of a terror attack in Norway in the coming months. Officials fear a recent call to
arms by the Islamic State terror group may inspire a “lone wolf” attack. Lone wolf
attacks are particularly hard for law enforcement to prevent and they can cause a
great deal of destruction, says a representative of the Security Services and Policy
Security Services to the newspaper.
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The Ministry of Justice is urging local law enforcement to increase surveillance
and take precautions during large public gatherings. - Military bases are on high
alert and being fortified as well. Major cities like Oslo are increasingly utilizing
nuclear detection devices to identify potential dirty bombs, says the representative.
The Ministry of Justice is asking citizens to be aware of their surroundings and
immediately report suspicious individuals or packages to law enforcement when
out in public.
The findings are of such a serious character that the authorities have chosen to
inform the public, despite the danger of creating fear in the public.
The story will be updated as new information becomes available.
134
Figure 4.7: Marginal effects of the targeted group by news story in different coun-
tries
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Appendix: Tables and figures
Table 4.3: Support for security measures
Security index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.357∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.341∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
CountryFinland 0.105∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
CountryFrance 0.093∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.093∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
CountryNorway 0.031∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
aget2 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
I(aget2̂ 2) −0.00004∗∗ −0.00005∗∗ −0.00004∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
education −0.021∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
femalet2 −0.014∗ −0.016∗ −0.015∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NewsIslamic attack 0.035∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.022)
NewsRight-wing attack 0.027∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.025)
ethnicIndex_cent 0.463∗∗ 0.457∗∗ 0.432∗∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.048)
GroupMuslims −0.154∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.153∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.025)
GroupIslamists −0.019 −0.004 0.009
(0.013) (0.010) (0.026)
GroupRight-Wing Extremists 0.002 −0.010 −0.0002
(0.013) (0.010) (0.026)
















NewsIslamic attack:GroupRight-Wing Extremists −0.004
(0.032)
NewsRight-wing attack:GroupRight-Wing Extremists 0.020
(0.037)
GroupMuslims:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) 0.382∗∗ 0.442.
(0.120) (0.243)
GroupIslamists:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) 0.217. 0.083
(0.119) (0.240)










ethnicIndex_cent:NewsIslamic attack:GroupRight-Wing Extremists 0.077
(0.085)
ethnicIndex_cent:NewsRight-wing attack:GroupRight-Wing Extremists −0.053
(0.098)
NewsIslamic attack:GroupMuslims:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) −0.052
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(0.298)
NewsRight-wing attack:GroupMuslims:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) −0.116
(0.335)
NewsIslamic attack:GroupIslamists:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) 0.257
(0.293)
NewsRight-wing attack:GroupIslamists:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) 0.060
(0.336)
NewsIslamic attack:GroupRight-Wing Extremists:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) 0.064
(0.293)
NewsRight-wing attack:GroupRight-Wing Extremists:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) −0.442
(0.342)
ethnicIndex_cent:NewsIslamic attack 0.047 0.012
(0.031) (0.059)
ethnicIndex_cent:NewsRight-wing attack 0.082∗ 0.086
(0.036) (0.066)
NewsIslamic attack:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) −0.114 −0.229
(0.107) (0.206)
NewsRight-wing attack:I(ethnicIndex_cent̂ 2) −0.182 −0.103
(0.125) (0.228)
N 6535 6535 6535
R-squared 0.315 0.274 0.317
Adj. R-squared 0.313 0.272 0.312
. p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Figure 4.8: Predicted support for security measures by groups
Control Islamic attack Right−wing attack
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics news experiment (standard deviation in parenhte-
ses)
Country Variable Control Islamic attack Right-wing attack
Norway N 476 971 504
Norway Age 52.5 51.7 52
Norway (15.9) (16.7) (16.6)
Norway Education 0.634 0.667 0.651
Norway (0.482) (0.471) (0.477)
Norway Immigration attitudes 0.418 0.377 0.383
Norway (0.262) (0.254) (0.25)
Norway Female 0.473 0.525 0.534
Norway (0.5) (0.5) (0.499)
Finland N 450 954 468
Finland Age 50.2 50.6 52.5
Finland (17.1) (16.6) (16.5)
Finland Education 0.191 0.224 0.195
Finland (0.394) (0.417) (0.397)
Finland Immigration attitudes 0.55 0.536 0.52
Finland (0.282) (0.272) (0.266)
Finland Female 0.598 0.568 0.583
Finland (0.491) (0.496) (0.494)
France N 458 893 454
France Age 45.2 45.7 46.6
France (14.5) (14.6) (15.3)
France Education 0.48 0.492 0.488
France (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
France Immigration attitudes 0.561 0.541 0.551
France (0.265) (0.275) (0.273)
France Female 0.533 0.529 0.513
France (0.499) (0.499) (0.5)
US N 461 983 451
US Age 45.9 46.3 43.9
US (16.5) (16.9) (16.8)
US Education 0.446 0.543 0.458
US (0.498) (0.498) (0.499)
US Immigration attitudes 0.483 0.472 0.471
US (0.257) (0.263) (0.263)
US Female 0.514 0.532 0.519
US (0.5) (0.499) (0.5)
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics group experiment (standard deviation in parenhte-
ses)
Country Variable People Muslims Islamists Right-Wing Extremists
Norway N 521 475 513 442
Norway Age 51.6 52.5 53.1 50.5
Norway (16.7) (17) (15.9) (16.3)
Norway Education 0.689 0.632 0.635 0.663
Norway (0.463) (0.483) (0.482) (0.473)
Norway Immigration attitudes 0.405 0.377 0.378 0.394
Norway (0.26) (0.252) (0.255) (0.252)
Norway Female 0.507 0.541 0.497 0.516
Norway (0.5) (0.499) (0.5) (0.5)
Finland N 482 480 447 462
Finland Age 51.3 52.2 49.3 51
Finland (16.7) (16.8) (16.6) (16.7)
Finland Education 0.198 0.21 0.219 0.208
Finland (0.399) (0.408) (0.414) (0.406)
Finland Immigration attitudes 0.546 0.53 0.523 0.541
Finland (0.267) (0.264) (0.285) (0.277)
Finland Female 0.595 0.594 0.566 0.558
Finland (0.491) (0.492) (0.496) (0.497)
France N 420 442 457 486
France Age 46.9 45.2 45.6 45.6
France (15.1) (14.6) (14.7) (14.6)
France Education 0.464 0.518 0.47 0.498
France (0.499) (0.5) (0.5) (0.501)
France Immigration attitudes 0.551 0.533 0.56 0.549
France (0.273) (0.276) (0.267) (0.272)
France Female 0.529 0.534 0.486 0.553
France (0.5) (0.499) (0.5) (0.498)
US N 467 478 481 469
US Age 45.6 45.7 45.1 46.1
US (17.4) (16.9) (16.5) (16.4)
US Education 0.433 0.505 0.531 0.527
US (0.496) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
US Immigration attitudes 0.455 0.49 0.465 0.487
US (0.269) (0.254) (0.26) (0.264)
US Female 0.516 0.565 0.549 0.467
US (0.5) (0.496) (0.498) (0.499)
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